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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5242
The Government of Malawi has since 2005 been 
pursuing a growth strategy mainly based on increasing 
the volume of agricultural exports. This entails that 
Malawi should endeavor to improve the competitiveness 
of its agricultural commodities so as to gain an increasing 
share of the regional and international markets. This 
paper analyzes the competitiveness of the country’s key 
agricultural commodities—tobacco, maize, cotton, 
and rice—using prices that prevailed in the 2007/08 
agricultural season. The paper employs a quantitative 
value chain methodology to assess the country’s prospects 
for competitiveness and suggest weak links along the 
value chain that require attention in order to improve 
trade competitiveness. The results indicate that Malawi 
has some competitive advantage in the production and 
This paper—a product of the Agricultural and Rural Unit, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
share the findings with a larger audience and encourage informed policy discussion. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at  htchale@worldbank.org.  
exportation of tobacco and cotton, and that this mostly 
derives from its low labor cost advantage. However, the 
results indicate that based on 2007/08 prices and costs, 
Malawi does not have competitive edge in maize and rice 
production for export. As such, Malawi would better 
pursue an import substitution strategy in these cereals, 
and perhaps only aim at the export market when regional 
market opportunities arise. Key factors that underpin 
Malawi’s narrow competitiveness include the high cost 
of inorganic fertilizer and other inputs, low productivity, 
and the higher trader margins and intermediation costs 
along the value chains. Furthermore, farm gate prices 
in Malawi are higher than in other countries, and this 
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1 This report was prepared by a team from the World Bank led by Jos Verbeek (PREM) as part of the 
background work for Malawi’s Country Economic Memorandum (CEM). The primary data collection and 
analysis for the Value Chain Study was undertaken by John Keyser (consultant) together with Hardwick 
Tchale (Agricultural Economist, AFTAR). The preparation of the report and the subsequent reviews were 
undertaken by the Agriculture Team comprising David Rohrbach (Senior Agricultural Economist, 
AFTAR), Hardwick Tchale (Agricultural Economist, AFTAR), Hans Binswanger (Consultant) and Jos 
Verbeek (Lead Economist, PREM).  
 
Initial drafts of the paper were presented at a stakeholders’ forum where all stakeholders had a chance to 
comment on the preliminary findings. Additional comments and reviews were provided by staff from key 
stakeholder institutions such as Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, the Tobacco Industry, National 




1.  This report presents the results of an analysis of Malawi’s competitiveness in key 
agricultural value chains. The analysis is based on prices prevailing in the 2007/08 agriculture 
season before the spike in agricultural commodity prices that preceded the global financial crisis. 
Specifically, the report covers two levels of smallholder management for open pollinated and 
hybrid maize, irrigated and non-irrigated rice, burley tobacco, and cotton. For the sake of 
completeness, the results of other recent value chains undertaken in Malawi have also been 
summarized and the main conclusions synchronized with those from this particular analysis.  
2.  The main objectives of the analysis are: 
  To determine private costs and profitability of different stages in the value 
chain: Only by understanding the costs and returns to farming itself and the other 
stages of production and distribution until the final market can policymakers begin to 
understand the incentives for production, processing, and shipping, as well as the 
incentives for improvement in each stage.  
  To understand cost composition: By analyzing the detailed cost structures of 
individual value chain participants, value chain analysis (VCA) can identify the types 
of costs that account for the majority of total value, and therefore focus on specific 
areas where new investment or other improvement could have the greatest impact on 
sector profitability and growth.  
  To measure trade competitiveness: This was aimed at exploring Malawi’s 
competitiveness in regional and global markets i.e. what are Malawi’s best 
opportunities for import substitution or exports? To do this, we compared the results 
with other countries in the region and beyond (Zambia, Mozambique, Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Brazil and Thailand) in which a similar methodology was applied during the 
past two years under the World Bank supported study on Competitive Commercial 
Agriculture in Africa (CCAA)
 1.  
 
3.  To address these issues, the analysis covers two levels of smallholder management for 
open pollinated and hybrid maize, irrigated and non-irrigated rice, burley tobacco, and cotton. 
Beyond farm production, the analysis is also based on enterprise budgets for the most typical crop 
assembly, processing, and distribution arrangement for each commodity up to the point where 
total accumulated value can most realistically be compared with an import or export parity price 
as a final measure of trade competitiveness. By identifying the types of costs that account for the 
majority of total value and where these costs occur, the value chain approach is designed to help 
policy makers and project planners zero in on specific areas where new investment or other types 
of improvement could have the greatest impact on profitability, competitiveness, and growth.    
                                                      
1 See Keyser, John C (2006). Definition of Methodology and Presentation of Templates for Value Chain Analysis, 
Competitive Commercial Agriculture in Africa (CCAA), The World Bank, Environmental, Rural and Social 
Development Unit, Washington DC. The methodology is built around a set of interlinked Excel templates designed to 
calculate standard indicators of costs and profitability at each major stage of the production cycle. By filling in the 
elements of each template for individual commodities and farm systems, the methodology offers a practical way to 
establish benchmark prices that can be compared with international standards and identify specific areas where costs 
can most effectively be reduced through policy change or other types of investment.  
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4.  Several limitations also need to be recognized. Most importantly, the results are based on 
indicative data and the analysis seeks to provide a general picture of the underlying costs, profits, 
and trade competitiveness only. The data used for the analysis were crosschecked through various 
discussions with sector investors and other key informants to ensure that the results provide a 
reliable picture of the 2007/08 conditions, but are not based on any kind of large sample survey or 
other extensive data collection exercise. Differences in yield, price, and market opportunities all 
have an important bearing on producer profits and trade competitiveness and the discussion 
should not be interpreted as a definitive assessment of individual business opportunities or project 
priorities. Again, the main objective is to provide information needed to assess potential 
investments and sector policies as part of a much larger Country Economic Memorandum.  
5.  The paper is organized in eleven sections including the introduction. Section II provides 
the country context, highlighting the importance of agriculture to the Malawi economy. Section 
III provides a brief overview of the methodology and main assumptions used for the value chain 
analysis. Sections IV to VIII highlight the main analytical results beginning with the input 
analysis, followed by the results for maize, rice, burley tobacco, and cotton value chains, 
respectively. Section IX presents a review of other value chains and related studies, with a view 
to synchronizing their findings to those of this study. Section X briefly discusses the key factors 
affecting agricultural competitiveness and also summarizes the results of some simulations that 
were undertaken to assess the impact of a number of scenarios on farm income and trade 
competitiveness. Section XI concludes with key findings and their policy implications.  
 
II. COUNTRY  CONTEXT 
 
6.  Agriculture in Malawi contributes over 35% to national GDP, employs over 80% of 
the labor force and contributes over 80% of the export earnings. Agriculture is the most 
critical for the Malawi economy in terms of job creation, export diversification, poverty reduction 
and overall growth. Real GDP growth in Malawi in 2007 was estimated at 7.9 percent and was 
projected at 7.4 percent in 2008. Although this was a slight reduction from the 8.2 percent 
achieved in 2006, economic growth has maintained an upward trend. This is attributed mainly to 
the improvements in agricultural sector performance.  Malawi has made strong strides in total 
maize output from 2.6 million tons in 2006, 3.4 million tons in 2007 and 3.6 million tons 
estimated for 2008/09 season. Although total tobacco output has not improved much, total 
proceeds from sales were estimated at USD195.2 million in 2007 and over USD460 million in 
2008 on account of better tobacco prices at the auction floors.  
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Figure 1. Agriculture’s share of total GDP (1970 – 2008) 
 
    Source: Economic Reports, various years. 
 
7.  Agricultural sector in Malawi is highly dominated by a few food and cash crops. In 
spite of past attempts to diversify the food and export basket, there is still high concentration on 
maize and tobacco as key food and cash crops, respectively. For example, in 2007, the main 
products with positive volume growth were tobacco (53 percent), sugar (9 percent), tea (9 
percent), cotton (3 percent) and edible nuts (4 percent). Although there is a slight shift away from 
tobacco, Malawi’s agricultural export base is highly concentrated in tobacco (see Figure 2). This 
high dependence on a narrow range of commodities makes Malawi agriculture highly vulnerable 
to effects of climate change (such as drought), in the case of maize and to the international 
lobbies against tobacco. The estate sector is relatively small and is confined to specific cash crops 
such as tobacco, tea and sugar. Its growth has been stagnant since the 1990s
2.  
Figure 2: Composition of Malawi’s agricultural export commodities by value (‘000 USD) 
 
8.  Food crops such as maize, cereals and roots and tubers form the basis of 
agricultural production in Malawi, and are grown by the majority of smallholder farmers on 
                                                      
2 The estate sector includes about 30,000 estates with about 1.1 million hectares under leasehold tenure. 
Comparatively, the smallholders occupy over 6 million hectares under the customary tenure. 














































over 80 percent of the total arable land. Of this maize alone is grown on over 70% of the arable 
land. With most of the arable land in the smallholder subsistence sector, Malawi does not have a 
lot of room for export diversification, at least compared to the neighboring countries. The 
livestock sub-sector contributes about 7 percent of agricultural GDP, and in 2007, the cattle 
population was estimated at about 800,000 while that of shoats (goats, pigs and sheep) was 
estimated at 2.3 million, 636,000 and 175,394, respectively. Fishing and forestry sub-sectors each 
account for less than 6 percent of agricultural GDP.   
9.  Food security has improved since 2006 due to the recorded surpluses in maize and 
other food crops. The food balances sheets have shown a positive trend since 2006 season (see 
Table 1). However, in spite of the national food surpluses, the market signals indicate some 
increases in the producer price of maize which is inconsistent with the declared surpluses. Many 
attribute the market tightening to speculation among the private traders, and an anticipation of 
over-estimation of the food production level. 
Table 1: Trends in domestic food gap (energy foods) 
Year  Total Food Requirement (MT) 
Domestic Availability 
(MT) 
Gross maize Gap/ 
Surplus (MT) 
1999/00 2,023,625  2,023,625  98,870 
2000/01 1,643,274  2,432,334  789,060 
2001/02 1,825,449  1,495,104  -195,229 
2002/03 2,035,643  1,351,549  -684,094 
2003/04 2,016,052  1,966,024  -50,028 
2004/05 2,039,291  1,502,259  -537,032 
2005/06 2,183,506  2,620,513  487,007 
2006/07 2,255,049  3,444,655  1,189,606 
2007/08 2,352,668  2,790,546  437,878 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. 
 
10.  Although total agricultural output has been increasing over the past decade, 
Malawi’s agricultural productivity, particularly among the majority of the smallholder 
farmers, has shown signs of stagnation or decline. For example, as shown in Figure 3, there 
has been no long-term improvement in average maize yields. Maize yields remain highly 
dependent on weather patterns and the implementation of input support programs, such as for 
example, the starter pack in the late 1990s, the drought recovery and targeted inputs program in 
early to mid 2000, and the input subsidy program thereafter. In the case of tobacco, the 
substantial yield gains attained in the early 1990s more especially after the repeal of the Special 
Crops Act have been reversed as average tobacco yield has been almost stagnant since the mid-
1990s
3. Most of the yield stagnation and fluctuations experienced in the first half of the last 
decade can be attributed to low adoption and less intensive use of productive agricultural 
technologies, unreliable rainfall pattern and also production inefficiencies. 
                                                      
3 The repeal of the Special Crops Act provided the smallholder farmers the right to grow and sell burley 
tobacco. Before 1991, burley tobacco was exclusively and legally an estate crop (Ng’ong’ola et al. 1997).  
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Figure 3: Yield trends in major smallholder crops, 1990 to 2007 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Annual Crop Estimates. 
 
Food prices 
11.  Food prices in general and maize prices in particular are much higher and highly 
variable compared to the trends experienced in previous years. Although the reasons for the 
high food prices are not fully understood, it appears that they are triggered partly by speculative 
behavior by traders and cautious response by farmers to the escalating commodity prices on the 
international market. As can be seen in Table 2, in February 2008, the price of maize had more 
than doubled from MWK21 per kg in the previous year (Feb 2007) to MWK43 per kg
4. From 
January 2008 to March 2008, the price had increased by 10 percent, with March representing the 
peak of the lean season. The maize harvest period which started in March in some parts of the 
country did not result in the weakening of the prices, as expected. As such, maize prices have 
kept on an upward trend, currently reaching over MWK60 per kg. The high volatility of prices 
between the harvest (March – June) and lean season (October – February) is typical of thin maize 
markets (see Figure 4). Farmers are compelled to engage in distress selling at low prices during 
the harvest period, only to buy back the maize during the lean season at much higher prices 
during the lean season. Over 80% of the smallholder farmers end up being net food buyers. 
Except for the warehouses that belong to the Government parastatal, the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), private warehousing is limited. Private 




                                                      
4 For most of this period, the exchange rate was fairly stable and the domestic inflation remained in single 
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12.  Value chain analysis has gained considerable popularity in recent years. Although many 
definitions are applied, value chains essentially represent enterprises in which different producers 
and marketing companies work within their respective businesses to pursue one or more end-
markets. Value chain participants sometimes cooperate to improve the overall competitiveness of 
the final product, but may also be completely unaware of the linkages between their operation and 
other upstream or downstream participants. Value chains therefore encompass all of the factors of 
production including land, labor, capital, technology, and inputs as well as all economic activities 
including input supply, production, transformation, handling, transport, marketing, and 
distribution necessary to create, sell, and deliver a product to a certain destination. 
13.  The main stages of an agricultural value chain are illustrated in Figure 4 below. In this 
diagram, dashed arrows flow from input supply to all other stages to show that this is a 
crosscutting function that affects all participants, not just at the farm level. Dashed arrows are 
also drawn from farm production to processing and distribution to show that some farmers may 
deliver their crop directly to a factory or, in the case of unprocessed goods, directly to the final 
market, thereby fulfilling the assembly and delivery function as well.  




































Figure 5: Stages of the Value Chain 
 
14.  In value chain analysis, all inputs and outputs carry forward their inherited value from the 
previous stage. This concept is important to stress in value chain analysis where the focus is on 
accumulated costs at different stages as a key determinant of trade competitiveness. The 
competitiveness of any domestic product depends on the efficiency of input supply, farm 
production, assembly, processing, and logistics up to final delivery point where the good 
competes internationally as an export or import substitute. By looking at the cost composition at 
each stage of the value chain and comparing these costs with world standards, the methodology 
not only shows if the country is internationally competitive, but also helps identify key stages 
where costs could most effectively be reduced as a strategy for sector growth.  
A. Analytical Framework 
15.  Based on these guiding principles, the analysis of Malawi’s agriculture competitiveness 
was prepared using a specific methodology developed for a recent study of Competitive 
Commercial Agriculture in Africa (CCAA).
5 The methodology is built around a set of interlinked 
Excel templates designed to calculate standard indicators of costs and profitability at each major 
stage of the production cycle. By filling in the elements of each template for individual 
commodities and farm systems, the methodology offers a practical way to establish benchmark 
prices that can be compared with international standards and identify specific areas where costs 
can most effectively be reduced through policy change or other types of investment.  
16.  According to the methodology, total costs are measured in terms of Domestic Value 
Added (DVA) and Shipment Value (SV), which constitute the main value chain indicators as 
follows. 
Domestic Value Added (DVA)     =  Domestic costs and mark-ups      [1] 
    + Official duties and tax 
        + Unofficial charges and extra costs 
 
Shipment Value (SV)          =   Domestic  Value  Added     [2] 
    + Foreign components 
17.  Because countries mainly have influence over prices within their own borders, the 
methodology is particularly interested in the composition of DVA as a leverage point for 
                                                      
5 Keyser, John C (2006). Definition of Methodology and Presentation of Templates for Value Chain 
Analysis, Competitive Commercial Agriculture in Africa (CCAA), The World Bank, Environmental, Rural 
and Social Development Unit, Washington DC. 








enhanced sector performance. These costs include legitimate business costs and mark-ups, 
official customs duties and taxes, and any number of unofficial payments and bribes that 
sometimes have to be made to facilitate a particular operation.
6 If some cost accounts for a large 
share of total value, or is significantly higher than an equivalent international benchmark, then 
new policies or investments focused on reducing that cost would likely be an effective strategy 
for improved competitiveness.  
18.  For cross-commodity and international comparisons, the final calculation of SV including 
foreign components is the most comprehensive measure of actual and potential competitiveness. 
For any given commodity, trade competitiveness is determined by comparing SV at the final 
market with an equivalent parity price (either a FOB price for exports or CIF price for import 
substitutes). By looking at the build-up of SV (and DVA) from stage to stage, the methodology 
therefore reveals the competitiveness of individual participants. If one stage accounts for a 
disproportionately large share of final shipment value, interventions focused on that part of the 
value chain likely also have a disproportionately large impact on the overall competitiveness of 
the chain. 
19.  A further advantage of the value chain methodology is that it allows for comparisons of 
production cost and other aspects of sector performance with the CCAA study countries for 
maize, cotton, rice and inputs. In Africa, the CCAA study was undertaken in Mozambique, 
Nigeria, and Zambia. To establish international benchmarks of successful development, a parallel 
analysis of value chain performance was also carried out for CCAA in Brazil and Thailand. 
Following the CCAA project, additional value chain research was undertaken in Cameroon 
covering maize and cotton and the data from this work are also available for comparison.
7 While 
this type of cross-country comparisons produces some interesting results that help better 
understand development opportunities in Malawi, differences in data collection and modeling 
mean that the results cannot be compared exactly.
8 Moreover the methodology cannot be used to 
say that farm production or assembly should cost a certain amount, or that one country is above 
the so-called benchmark, because conditions naturally vary between countries for many good and 
inherent reasons. This study therefore highlights these comparisons whenever they add value to 
the understanding of Malawi’s growth opportunities, but does not consistently report the other 
countries’ benchmark indicators for every value chain stage or process. 
20.  Another important distinction in the methodology is that agriculture commodities can 
take on different forms at each stage of the value chain. In the most basic sense, this can be the 
difference between a recently harvested farm product with high moisture content and one that has 
been assembled in a warehouse and dried for several months. Agriculture raw materials may also 
be processed into one or more finished goods. Seed cotton, for example, is processed into lint and 
seed while leaf tobacco must be threshed to remove the tips and stems before export. Similarly, 
paddy rice must be milled to produce polished grain. DVA and SV are therefore measured 
according to equations [1] and [2] on a per ton basis for the following product forms: 
  
                                                      
6 For Malawi, information on unofficial costs were unavailable and “domestic extras” were excluded from 
the analysis. 
7 World Bank (2008). Cameroon Agriculture Value Chain Competitiveness Study, Agriculture and Rural 
Development (AFTAR) Sustainable Development Network, Washington DC.   
8 For more details of the CCAA results (and discussion of the limitations of cross-country analysis) see 
Keyser, John C (2008). Competitive Commercial Agriculture in Africa (CCAA) Synthesis of Quantitative 
Results. The World Bank, Environmental, Rural and Social Development Unit, Washington DC.  
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Farm production     Farm gate product  
Assembly       Assembled raw material  
Processing    Processed  raw  material 
International logistics    Traded commodity (Product 1, 2, 3) 
21.  Finally, the value chain analysis is also interested in the private costs and returns that 
accrue to individual participants. Agriculture production, processing, and marketing begins with 
the decisions private investors make and it is important to have a sense of the underlying financial 
costs and profitability of competing enterprises first to determine if the system is viable and 
second to identify opportunities for poverty reduction. Because the methodology is constructed 
around enterprise budgets, these measurements are easy to make. At the farm level, private costs 
and returns are measured in per hectare and per ton terms; at later stages, values are measured in 
per MT terms only. From these indicators, calculations showing the rate of return to variable and 
fixed expenditure, total investment requirements, demand for labor, and other components of 
private and social importance can be made.  
B. Procedures and Assumptions 
22.  In preparing the analysis of Malawi’s agriculture competitiveness, the approach was to 
provide an indicative picture of value chain costs and returns. All value chain participants 
naturally produce according to their own objectives and resource limitations. The analysis 
therefore cannot identify optimal cropping patterns or investment strategies for individuals, and is 
instead structured around a broad spectrum of management possibilities. This approach is most 
useful for understanding major trade-offs associated with different production decisions needed at 
the early stage of planning an agriculture investment program. The main procedures and 
assumptions used for this analysis are briefly described below. 
23.  Data collection. Data collection was carried out in Malawi from April to May 2008 and 
involved a brief literature review, key informant interviews, and sourcing of production 
information from crop research institutes, statistical abstracts and farmers’ groups. Subsequent to 
the data collection and preliminary analysis, industry experts were consulted to validate the draft 
results and seek feedback on major bottlenecks and recommendations for improvement. The 
preliminary templates were then revised based on the feedback received to produce the final 
models whose results are discussed in this report.  
24.  Farm management. The analysis covers two levels of progressively intensive 
smallholder management. At the FAM-low level, farmers follow a fairly basic management 
regime and use only the most essential farm inputs. Some fertilizer is included at the FAM-low 
level, but producers otherwise make little use of purchased inputs and rely mainly on family 
labor. The FAM-high level, on the other hand, represents the type of improvements a small 
farmer could realistically make with improved access to inputs and marginally better management 
skill. Compared with FAM-low, therefore, FAM-high management is based on a modest 
increment in fertilizer, more intensive and better use of pesticides and/or agrichemicals as 
required for each crop, more timely planting, and better attention to weed control. It is further 
assumed that FAM-high producers make more intensive use of hired labor due to the additional 
management requirements and better timing of key tasks.  
25.  Commodity coverage. The analysis covers four important smallholder commodities 
selected because of their importance to poverty reduction, food security, and/or export growth. 
The full list of crops and farm systems covered is set out in the Table 2. Each farm variation  
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required a specific per hectare crop budget. Per ton budgets were then used to model the most 
relevant assembly, processing, and distribution arrangement for each commodity. 
Table 2: List of crop commodities analyzed 
  Rain-fed Crops  Irrigated Crops 
FAM-low  FAM-high  FAM-low  FAM-high 
Maize - OPV  X X     
Maize - hybrid  X X X X 
Rice  X X X X 
Burley Tobacco  X X     
Cotton  X X     
 
26.  Agriculture prices. Unless noted, all prices reported in this paper are for the 2007/08 
agriculture season. Farm input and output prices include transport up to the farm gate or other 
place where the next participant in the value chain takes over responsibility for that commodity. 
Input prices and output prices for maize are based on information collected from primary 
informants and were chosen to represent the prices most producers in all parts of Malawi can 
expect to encounter. In the case of cotton, the government established minimum price for seed 
cotton was used to, and for rice, the farm gate price is the one paid by NASFAM. For burley 
tobacco, two price levels are considered based on average auction values for good and better 
quality tobacco grown at the FAM-low and FAM-high levels respectively. 
27.  Crop yields. Crop yields reflect a realistic expectation in a year with “normal” growing 
conditions using the inputs charged at each management level. Due to an almost limitless number 
of possible variations related to seasonal growing conditions, local soil type, farmer skill, seed 
quality, and many other factors, actual yields on individual farms can be quite different than 
shown here. Naturally, this can have a significant bearing on individual profits and total costs per 
ton.  
28.  Family labor. No charge is included for family labor in the calculation of a private costs 
and returns. This approach is necessary for the financial calculations because family labor is not 
paid for with an actual expenditure of cash. The use of family labor does, of course, have an 
opportunity cost, but by excluding this from the financial estimates, crop profits can easily be 
reinterpreted as returns to family labor and all other non-cash inputs used to produce and market 
that commodity. The benefit of this method is that it allows direct comparisons between 
enterprises without the risk of applying incorrect proxy values. This approach is also consistent 
with the standard definition of an opportunity cost which states that the value of family labor is 
the income foregone by not engaging in the next most profitable activity.  
29.  For the calculation of DVA and SV, however, a different approach is needed. At this 
level, the value chain analysis is interested in the total cost of all factors used in the production 
and marketing of each agricultural commodity. Because family labor often accounts for a large 
share of production costs in Malawi, some proxy value needed to be applied. For this reason, the 
approach taken was to apply a rule of thumb estimate to the value chain calculations by charging 
family labor at 60% of the rate for casual labor. FAM farmers rarely have the opportunity to sell  
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their labor at the full wage rate every day of the year and this approach is at least a clear and 
simple way to recognize the value of this input. Further analysis could always look at the effects 
of different family wage rate assumptions, but the basic outcome is easy to predict since labor 
costs and final estimated shipment values are directly related. In all cases, the quantity of family 
labor was estimated on the basis of a five member household with proportionate adjustments for 
tasks that must be carried out over a limited number of days, in which case hired labor must be 
used. 
30.  Investment costs. The annual per hectare (or per ton) cost of long term investments used 
at each stage of the value chain have been estimated using the capital recovery cost method. 
Specifically, this cost is the annual payment that will repay the cost of a fixed input over its useful 
life and provide an economic rate of return on the investment. This approach has the advantage 
over the simple division of an input’s value by its useful life as it accounts for the fact that if the 
investor did not purchase the input, the money could have been invested in some other 
enterprise.
9 
31.  Domestic transportation. For domestic routes, the transport cost estimate of MWK 
18.00 per ton per kilometer (USD 0.129) has been assumed. This is the average cost reported 
during data collection by transport experts and private operators for the 2007/08 season. For 
cotton a premium of 30% premium was applied to account for the light/bulky nature of this good. 
32.  International transport. Because the value chain analysis is interested in comparing 
Malawi’s final shipment value for each commodity with an international parity price, road and 
sea freight prices were also needed. In this case, the cost estimates were made from information 
provided by the Ministry of Transport as set out below. For maize, a price of USD 80 per MT was 
used to calculate freight costs from the SAFEX reference point at Randfontein to Harare plus 
USD 40 per MT for onward freight from Harare to Blantyre.  
Table 3: Fixed transport rates for international routes 
 
33.  With respect to ocean freight, rule of thumb prices excluding port fees were used as 
follows:  
  Fertilizer (ex Black Sea or Middle East) = USD 56.00 per MT to Beira. 
                                                      
9 Annual cost per hectare (or per MT) = purchase price of implement * per hectare (or per MT) share of 
total use * capital recovery factor.  CRF = ((1+i)^n)*i/(1+i)^n-1 where i = real interest on savings and n = 
number of years in the implement’s useful life.  See Monke and Pearson, 1989 for a detailed discussion of 
this methodology. 
Fixed rates for International Routes (road, including port charges)
Container rates reported by Ministry of Tranport including land transport and port charges
USD per 40' container Distance
(+/- 32 MT maximum load) MWK USD (Km) MWK USD
Beira - Blantyre 2,710               11,856             84.69               620                  19.12               0.137
Beira - Lilongwe 2,850               12,469             89.06               931                  13.39               0.096
Nacala - Blantyre 2,860               12,513             89.38               880                  14.22               0.102
Nacala - Lilongwe 3,095               13,541             96.72               1,191               11.37               0.081
Durban - Blantyre 7,100               31,063             221.88             2,480               12.53               0.089
Durban - Lilongwe 7,200               31,500             225.00             2,730               11.54               0.082
Dar es Salaam - Lilongwe 4,560               19,950             142.50             1,720               11.60               0.083
Dar es Salaam - Blantyre 5,360               23,450             167.50           2,031             11.55             0.082
Port charges quoted at $750 for Beira and Nacala; $950 for Durban; and $360 for Dar es Salaam.
Per MT MT per Km 
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  Rice (ex Thailand) = USD 60.00 per MT to Durban + USD 40.00 to Beira 
  Cotton (ex Far East, Cot look A-Index reference price) = USD 220 per MT to Nacala 
 
IV.  INPUT PRICE ANALYSIS 
 
34.  Agriculture value chain analysis begins at the input supply level. The efficiency of a 
country’s input supply system has an obvious bearing on final SV not only in terms of the direct 
impact on unit prices, but also because of the influence on farmer decision making, optimal 
cropping patterns, choice of processing technology, and competitiveness of different transport 
arrangements. By looking at the composition of input prices at the place where each item is used, 
the quantitative methodology helps to identify areas where costs could realistically be reduced as 
a strategy for improved competitiveness. Further consideration of how the inputs are used in each 
value chain is needed to understand the relative importance of each item, but analysis of basic 
input prices is the first essential part of value chain assessment.  
A. Fuel Price Build-up 
35.  Domestic transportation costs have an important bearing on the price of agriculture inputs 
and outputs and are therefore critical to the competitiveness analysis. A breakdown of Malawi’s 
fuel price build-up is presented below and shows that 32.9% of the pump price (or total SV) is 
made up of foreign costs and that 83.2% of domestic costs are taxes.   
Table 4: Build-up of domestic fuel prices (MWK per liter) 
 
36.  With a total estimated tax burden of MWK 130.86 (USD 0.94) per liter, these data show 
that Malawi has considerable scope to influence the price of domestic transportation. Based on 
the 2006 price build-up of fertilizer shown below, for example, it can be estimated that the farm 
gate price includes at least USD 32.14 (MWK 5,199) per MT for domestic transportation. Given 
the accumulated tax rate and foreign exchange percentage from Table 5 above, this works out to 
Foreign Total
Tambala MWK Costs Tax Total DVA Costs SV
FOB 6,902.32      69.02              -             69.02        69.02       
Ralilage 72.84           0.73                -             0.73          0.73         
Road 1,222.14      12.22              6.11          6.11           6.11          12.22       
Insurance/handling 85.37           0.85                -             0.85          0.85         
Losses 52.91           0.53                -             0.53          0.53         
IBLC (BT/LL) 8,335.58      83.36              6.11        -          6.11         77.25      83.36       
MERA levy 37.00           0.37                0.37          0.37           0.37         
Road levy 1,170.00      11.70              11.70        11.70         11.70       
MBS cess 16.67           0.17                0.17          0.17           0.17         
Enery fund 40.00           0.40                0.40          0.40           0.40         
Price stablization fund 8,238.26      82.38              82.38        82.38         82.38       
Duty free price 17,837.51    178.38            6.11        95.02      101.13     77.25      178.38     
Duty 833.56         8.34                8.34          8.34           8.34         
Excise duty 2,750.74      27.51              27.51        27.51         27.51       
Duty paid price 21,421.81    214.22            6.11        130.86    136.97     77.25      214.22     
Distribution margin 200.00         2.00                2.00          2.00           2.00         
Gross margin 934.86         9.35                9.35          9.35           9.35         
Wholesale price 22,556.67    225.57            17.46      130.86    148.32     77.25      225.57     
Retail margin 893.33         8.93                8.93          8.93           8.93         
PUMP PRICE 23,450.00    234.50            26.39      130.86    157.25     77.25      234.50     
Price Buil-up (per liter) DVA 
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USD 20.73 (MWK 2,902) of fuel tax per MT fertilizer, which is equal to about 4% of a farmer’s 
cost for this input.   
37.  Naturally, any change in fuel tax needs to be considered in the wider context of Malawi’s 
overall fiscal policy, but these data do at least help illustrate the important link between transport 
costs and agriculture competitiveness. Fertilizer is just one agriculture input and any reduction in 
transport costs could be expected to trickle down to benefit other inputs as well.  
B. Fertilizer 
38.  Fertilizer is a significant component of farm costs and domestic price levels have a major 
bearing on final competitiveness, not just in terms of accumulated SV at the point of final 
competition, but also in terms of the influence on farmer decision making and yield expectations. 
In this respect, one important finding of the input analysis is that fertilizer prices are relatively 
high in Malawi compared with regional neighbors and other international competitors (see Figure 
6). 
Figure 6: Fertilizer price comparison 
 
39.  Table 5 shows the build-up of 2006 fertilizer prices in Malawi and Zambia. These data 
show that Malawi enjoys slightly lower foreign transportation costs to the frontier than Zambia, 
but generally pays a higher per MT price for fertilizer because of the lack of domestic blending 
capabilities. Not all fertilizer in Zambia is domestically blended, but where this takes place raw 
ingredients can be purchased for a lower price. Because of this savings, Zambia also enjoys lower 
dealer mark-ups (even at the same percentage) than Malawi. According to the estimates below, 
Zambia also enjoys slightly lower domestic transport costs, but even if the values were the same, 
the total price of fertilizer in Malawi would still be higher than in Zambia. Neither Zambia nor 
Malawi imposes customs duty, VAT, or other direct tax on fertilizer. 

















Cameroon - south (2007)







40.  The charts below provide a graphic illustration of the differences in fertilizer price build-
up between Zambia and Malawi.  
 
Figure 7: Malawi and Zambia fertilizer price build-up 
 































Table 5: 2006 Fertilizer Price Build-up, Comparison of 
Observed Prices in Malawi and Zambia (USD per MT)
Malawi Zambia
Price at origin 245.00    200.00   
Transport to frontier 140.69    141.44   
Customs duty & excise -    -   
VAT or other direct tax -    -   
Clearing fees 11.57    6.83   
Domestic transport (200km) 21.43    20.00   
Domestic blending -    9.00   
Wholesaler mark-up 41.87    37.73   
Transport to place of sale (100km) 10.71    10.00   
Retailer mark-up 56.55    42.50   
Transport to place of use 5.00    3.75   
Total (per MT) 532.82    471.25   





41.  In 2008 world fertilizer price spiked to unprecedented levels which had a major impact 
on domestic prices in 2008/09, not least of all because most domestic importers (including the 
government under its own fertilizer subsidy program) happen to make their purchases each year 
at almost the same time in the season when global prices were at their highest (see graph). 
Between 2007 and 2008, the typical retail price at the start of the agricultural season for a 50 bag 
of urea increased from MWK 3,800 (USD 27.14) to more than MWK 7,400 (USD 52.86).  
Figure 8: Fertilizer price trends (2004-2008) 
 
Ammonia, fob Black Sea; Urea, prilled bulk Black Sea; CAN, Calcium Ammonium Nitrate, bulk cif Germany. 




























































42.  The pie charts in Figure 9 show the differences in the composition of domestic fertilizer 
prices between 2007 and 2008. As shown, the price increase in 2008 meant that the price at origin 
increased from 54% of farm gate SV to 62%. Once all foreign costs, including international 
shipping and imported fuel for domestic transport for domestic transport are taken into account, 
the total foreign exchange component of fertilizer increased from 80% in 2007 to 82% in 2008. 
Other than negotiating for better international prices through forward contracts or other improved 
supply arrangements, therefore, these data show that Malawi has limited scope to influence the 
farm gate price of this important input. Investments in improved distribution networks for 
fertilizer and domestic blending could help, but compared to changes in foreign costs, these 
investments could only have limited impact on agriculture competitiveness. 
43.  Finally, one further important point to note from the pie charts below is that although 
Malawi does not impose any direct tax on fertilizer in the form of customs duty or VAT, the 
analysis reveals that domestic taxes still accounted for around 8% of total farm gate SV in 2007 
and 2008. These taxes included VAT on clearing fees, fuel taxes, trading licenses, and profit tax 
charged on dealer mark-ups. As a strategy to improve agriculture competitiveness, therefore, 
there may be some scope for policymakers to reduce specific taxes that pertain to fertilizer 
imports and trade. 















































































44.  The next set of charts in Figure 10 show the impact of different tax rates on agriculture 
prices by comparing the cost build-up of insecticides and herbicides. In this case, insecticides 
(which are important inputs for smallholder cotton and tobacco) do not attract import duty or 
VAT, whereas herbicides (which are not widely used by smallholders, but could substitute for 
labor spent on weeding) attract 17.5% VAT and 5% customs duty.
10 As shown below, this means 
that the final price composition of insecticides includes only 5% domestic tax compared to 21% 
for herbicides.  







45.  While the specific question of whether or not it would be an effective strategy for Malawi 
to reduce the tax rate on herbicides is beyond the scope of the present discussion, these data 
illustrate how different tax rates can affect farmer decision making and, ultimately, agriculture 
competitiveness. If an insecticide costs USD 1.00 in the place where it is produced, for example, 
the final farm gate SV would work out to USD 1.24. On the other hand, herbicide that cost USD 
1.00 per unit in the foreign market would have a final SV of USD 1.52 as a result of the 
additional tax. In this simple example, therefore, the elimination of VAT and 5% import duty on 
herbicides could result in a 28% savings in unit costs for the farmer and may be a way to 
encourage growers to adopt this technology. 
                                                      
10 In 2008, VAT was reduced to 16%. 












































































D. Hybrid Maize Seed 
46.  The input analysis in Malawi also included an examination of farm and assembly-level 
costs of hybrid seed production. This work was undertaken to derive the conversion factors 
required by the spreadsheet methodology for the analysis of smallholder hybrid maize and is 
based on information supplied by one commercial seed company only. Given this limitation, the 
results should not be interpreted as a definitive picture of the costs and returns to seed 
multiplication, but only as a snapshot view of what one company is reporting.  
47.  Seed multiplication requires strict adherence to management guidelines and is therefore 
mainly undertaken by large and medium-scale estates with a commercial outlook rather than by 
smallholders. The company modeled here uses foundation seed imported from South Africa 
which is then multiplied on contract by farmers with the capacity to cultivate a minimum of 10 
hectares. There is no provision for loans and most growers are within 200km of Lilongwe.  
48.  Farm level analysis. Farm-level data for the hybrid seed multiplication based on a yield 
of 7MT/ha and price to the farmer of MWK 49,350 (USD 352.50) per MT are set out below. As 
shown, the enterprise can be quite profitable, but also requires a large cash commitment. Over the 
10ha minimum plot size, the grower’s total variable costs work out to nearly USD 16,000 (MWK 
2.24 million).   
Table 6: Farm-level analysis of hybrid maize seed multiplication 
 
 
49.  The charts in Figure 11 show the cost composition of farm-level costs for hybrid seed 
from the financial and value chain perspectives. As shown, imported seed and fertilizer account 
for a combined 56% of total costs. Once other foreign components are taken into account, around 
2/3 of the farm gate value of domestically multiplied seed is foreign. As a mechanized operation, 
hired labor only accounts for an estimated 5% of farm-level SV.  




MWK USD MWK USD
Gross revenue (yield * price) 345,450       2,467.50     49,350        352.50       
Production costs
  Variable costs 223,250       1,594.64       31,893          227.81         
  Investment costs 41,258         294.70          5,894            42.10           
  Total costs 264,508       1,889.34     37,787        269.91       
Farmer income
  Gross margin (revenue - var costs) 122,200       872.86        17,457        124.69       
  Net profit (gross margin - invest costs) 80,942        578.16        11,563        82.59         
Per Hectare Per Ton
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50.  Distribution Level (processing, packaging, and marketing). The next set of tables and 
charts show the estimated ton costs and returns to the seed company. Once grading, seed dressing, 
packing, storage, and distribution costs to domestic retailers are taken into account, the data show 
that the company makes a net profit of around USD 17.14 (MWK 2,400) per MT. This is about 
21% of the per MT profits received by farmers. Whereas a farmer who multiplies seed over 10ha 
can expect a total yield of around 70 MT, seed companies trade far greater volumes reaching into 
hundreds of thousands of tons per year.  




51.  As indicated by the charts below, the analysis found that operations after farm production 
add considerably to domestic costs. These costs include payment to the farmer, labor at the 
processing facility, and domestic utilities. Whereas the foreign share of total SV decreases from 
66% to 36%, however, the overall tax burden on hybrid seed production nearly doubles from 9% 
to 16%.  
 
 
MWK per USD per % of % of
MT MT DVA SV
    Domestic costs 9,503           67.88            74% 25%
    Duties and tax 3,299           23.56            26% 9%
    Additional expenses -                 -                0% 0%
    Total DVA 12,802         91.44           100% 34%
    Foreign costs 24,985         178.46          195% 66%
    Total SV 37,787         269.91         295% 100%
foreign conv factors (cf) domestic conv factors (cf)
% foreign  66.12% tax as % DVA  0.258           
foreign cf  1.107           extras  -             
HYBRID SEED
(Process and distribute) MWK USD MWK USD
Gross revenue (qty sold * price) 840,000       6,000.00     120,000      857.14     
Production costs
  Crop purchases (payment to farmer) 345,450       2,467.50       49,350          352.50       
  Other variable costs 477,750       3,412.50       68,250          487.50       
  Investment costs -               -                -                -             
  Total costs 823,200       5,880.00     117,600      840.00     
  Gross margin (revenue - total var costs) 16,800        120.00        2,400          17.14       
  Net profit (gross margin - invest costs) 16,800        120.00        2,400          17.14       
Per Hectare Per Ton
Seed Company's Profit Margins





































52.  Value chain build-up. Finally, the table below summarizes the build-up of value chain 
cost components for hybrid seed. The values for packed seed are measured at the factory gate 
before distribution to local retailers. As defined by the value chain methodology, values at this 
level include all costs carried forward from farm production plus farmer profits which are counted 
at the packed seed stage since this is a cost paid by the factory. As shown, actual farm gate costs 
only amount to 31% of total SV; farmer profits add a further 10% to total SV; and factory costs 
(including profit to the seed company) add a further 59% to total SV before retail distribution.  
  
 
53.  As a strategy to reduce the cost of hybrid seed, some further examination of factory costs 
may be in order. Utility costs (including the cost of power disruptions), taxes on imported seed 
dressing, and taxes on other business operating expenses are areas where possible savings could 
be achieved. Rents (i.e. royalties) by the seed company on imported foundation seed also appear 
significant and could be an area where Malawi research institutes could play a more dynamic and 
active role in helping to bring down the cost of this important input.   
 
MWK per USD per % of % of
MT MT DVA SV
    Domestic costs 56,682         404.87          75% 48%
    Duties and tax 18,737         133.83          25% 16%
    Additional expenses -                 -                0% 0%
    Total DVA 75,418         538.70        100% 64%
    Foreign costs 42,182         301.30          56% 36%
    Total SV 117,600       840.00        156% 100%
foreign conv factors (cf) domestic conv factors (cf)
% foreign  35.87% tax as % DVA  0.248         
foreign cf  1.107           extras  -           
MWK USD MWK USD
Domestic Value Added
Costs & mark-ups 8,183           58.45           57,306         409.33        
Official duties & tax 4,797           34.27           18,726         133.76        
Additional costs -               -               -               -              
Total DVA 12,981         92.72         76,032       543.09      
Foreign costs 24,806         177.19         41,568         296.91        
Total Shipment Value 37,787         269.91       117,600     840.00      
PRODUCT READY FOR USE





54.  Maize is by far the most important food crop in Malawi and is grown on over 70% of 
land cultivated by small-scale farmers. Due to the dominance of the food self-sufficiency policy, 
coupled with weak and very thin maize markets, almost all smallholder farmers grow maize as a 
matter of precautionary principle. Moreover, maize is the dominant cereal in Malawi’s food 
basket, both in terms of the area under food crops (where it takes up over 90 percent) and in 
cereal- based calories where it comprises over 90 percent (see Table 8). However, it is important 
to note that in terms of total calories produced roots and tubers (cassava and potatoes) have also 
become increasingly important, more especially after economic liberalization in the 1990s (see 
Figure 12). This notwithstanding, maize is still an important staple crop and the primary supplier 
of calories in many parts of Malawi and any major fluctuations in its production have always had 
significant implications on the country’s food security.  
Table 8: Importance of maize in Malawi’s food basket 
   Area (000 ha)  Yield (kg/hectare)  Kcal/capita/day  (Production) 
    2006  2007 2008 2006  2007 2008  2006 2007  2008 
Wheat  2  2  3  1 211  2 297  1 981  2  4  4 
Maize  1 620  1 688  1 647  1 590  2 040  1 790  1433  1883  1427 
Millet 41  45  44  658  719 758  22 26  24 
Sorghum  71  74 75  769  859  847  44 51  45 
Rice (Paddy)  53  53  53  1 743  1 743  1 743  50  49  44 
Rice (Mill.) - imports  53  53  53  1 129  1 129 1  129  50  49  43 
Total Cereals (coarse 
Grains + milled rice) 
1 733  1 807  1 766  1 534  1 959  1 724  1601  2062  1587 
Cassava  162  169 185  17,300  18,200  19,400 706 764  793 
S.  potatoes  130  142 159  13,400  14,500  15,900 370 428  475 
I. potatoes  41  39  46  13,000  15,400  14,700  97  107  108 
Total roots/tubers  333  350  390        1173  1299  1376 
Total (Cereals + roots 
and tubers) 
2066  2157 2156        2874 3361  2963 
% maize in total 
cereals 
93.5  93.4  93.3        90  91  90 
% maize in total 
Calories 
78.4  78.3  76.4        52  56  48 
Note: Authors calculations based on FAO conversion factors (Kcal per kg): maize grain = 356; 








Source: Authors calculations based on FAOSTAT (for production data) and FAO 
conversion factors.  
56.  The value chain analysis covers five levels of maize production differentiated on the 
basis of farm management, crop varieties, and irrigation. Farm level profits are based on selling 
to a small trader at roadside location somewhere near the farm. Assembly level costs then 
include storage, fumigation, and transportation of the maize over an indicative distance of 
130km into a mill location where the accumulated SV can be compared with import parity. For 
export parity, further transport costs to Zimbabwe were taken into account as described in the 
discussion of Malawi’s final trade competitiveness. Details of these value chain assumptions 












Figure 12: Malawi: Calorie composition (1990-2008)
maize wheat millet sorghum rice cassava s/potato i/potato 
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Table 9: Maize, value chain assumptions 
Sector  Yield 
(MT/Ha)  Farm  Assembly 
Rain-fed Maize 
FAM-OPV 1.1 
35kg saved OPV seed, 1x1 
fertilizer, no chemicals, ox 
cart to market, 85 days labor 
(58 days family) 
Buy grain in small quantities at roadside from 
many farmers, provide bags, short-term storage 
and fumigation.  
 
Then 130km own transport into mill 
FAM-low 1.50 
25kg hybrid seed, 2x2 
fertilizer, no chemicals, ox 
cart to market, 90 days labor 
 (60 days family) 
FAM-high 2.50 
25kg hybrid seed, 4x4 
fertilizer, no chemicals, hired 
vehicle to market, 110 days 
labor 
(70 days family) 
Irrigated Maize 
FAM-low 
(irrig)  2.50 
25kg hybrid seed, 2x1 
fertilizer, no chemicals, 
pumping costs and WUA fee, 
ox cart to market, 100 days 
labor  (68 days family) 
Same as above, but assume less time to 
assemble a sufficient quantity to justify 
delivery due to higher yields and concentrated 
production.  FAM-high 
(irrig)  3.50 
25kg hybrid seed, 4x4 
fertilizer, no chemicals, 
pumping costs and WUA fee, 
ox cart to market, 115 days 
labor  (73 days family) 




57  Farm-level analysis. Key data from the farm level analysis of maize are summarized in 
the table below. In interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind that most small farmers in 
Malawi cultivate less than a full hectare of maize. On a national basis, only around 0.8 ha are 
available per farm household of which some land is usually given to a cash crop like tobacco or 
cotton. Assuming that a “typical” household only cultivates maybe 0.5 ha of maize, therefore, the 
actual costs and profits would be half of what are shown below. Or, to be more specific, half of a 
hectare of high-input rain fed maize provides an annual net profit of just USD 35.19 
(MWK4,926) compared with half a hectare of high-input irrigated maize which returns USD 
119.12 (MWK 16,676) or about 47% of Malawi’s 2007 per capita income.  
MK per MT USD per MT Product Form Location
Farm gate price 28,000         200.00             Loose grain Roadside
Assembled raw material 45,000         321.43             Bagged grain Into Mill 
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Table 10: Maize, farm-level indicators 
 
 
58.  Several other points are worth noting from the farm-level indicators as follows.  
  Irrigation can result in a significant improvement in farmer incomes, but does not 
contribute to improved trade competitiveness as measured by farm gate SV. Ton-
for ton, in fact, open pollinated varieties (OPV) maize is the lowest cost product 
and therefore most competitive.  
  With irrigation, low-input maize provides slightly more net profit and a far better 
rate of return than with high input management. Similarly, without irrigation, the 
rates of return to variable costs deteriorate at each level of higher input 
management.  
  Taken together, these poor results for supposedly “improved” management 
suggest that Malawi is already at the point of diminishing marginal returns to 
fertilizer and other yield enhancing technologies. The high cost of fertilizer 
contributes to this poor result and the analysis shows that efforts to reduce this 
cost are not only important for income and trade competitiveness, but also for 
achieving higher yields and domestic food security.  
  At 44-61%, the foreign exchange content of maize is largely accounted for by the 
imported costs of fertilizer. Tax as a share of DVA increases with higher input 
management as a result of incremental fertilizer use and, in the case of irrigated 
maize, because of pumping and foreign costs associated with irrigation 
development.  
 
59.  The chart in Figure 13 shows the per hectare cost components in more detail. As shown, 
farm costs increase significantly at each level of improved management in which fertilizer 
accounts for the majority of total expenditure. Although yields also increase with higher 
management, the additional expenditure on fertilizer and other inputs is likely to be difficult for 
poor households to afford without financial support. In the case of irrigated maize, the value in 
the top part of the bar for irrigation costs cover pumping and water user association (WUA) fees 
only. Depreciation on the irrigation infrastructure is assumed to be paid for by government and/or 



















FAM-OPV 44% 14%       116.29       70.67            0.61       158.35 
FAM-low 54% 19%       201.43  65.53                  0.33  173.46       
FAM-high 61% 28%       381.43  70.38                  0.18  183.85       
Irrigated
FAM-low 44% 20% 200.23        250.38                1.25  171.72       
FAM-high 54% 25% 413.57       238.23              0.58  183.88      
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Figure 13: Maize, composition of farm-level SV 
 
 
60.  In terms of the per MT build-up of farm level SV, the data in Figure 13 show that the per 
MT shipment value increases with each level of management improvement, thus implying higher 
costs and lower overall competitiveness. Low-input irrigated maize has a slightly lower per MT 
SV than rain fed hybrid maize, but ton-for-ton high-input irrigated maize has the greatest total SV 
of all and is therefore the least competitive internationally. Although volume increases are also an 
important part of achieving improved competitiveness since this can help traders save on the time 
required to amass large enough quantities to justify transport to a storage shed, mill, or other 
assembly point, the data clearly indicate that more intensive management does not necessarily 
lead to improved trade competitiveness. 
61.  Figure 14 compares Malawi’s farm gate SVs for maize with data from other countries 
where similar value chain analysis had been carried out. Although differences between years 
mean that the results cannot be compared exactly, the data reveal an important trend whereby 
Malawi appears to be a relatively high cost producer of maize at the farm level. Compared with 
neighboring Mozambique, for example, it costs more than three times as much to produce a ton of 
maize in Malawi. Similarly, compared with family and emerging commercial farmers in Zambia, 
Malawi also has higher costs. Only in the case of Cameroon, where the models were based on 
production in a remote inland area with high fertilizer costs, are the costs for family sector 
farmers similar to those in Malawi.  
62.  A second chart in Figure 14 compares Malawi domestic prices (at the farm-gate) with 
those of other countries. Although much of the discussion of agriculture policy revolves around 
how to increase farm gate prices, these data show that producer prices in Malawi are already 
relatively high. Naturally, this helps to make maize production a more profitable enterprise for the 
producer, but equally contributes to higher food costs for urban consumers and higher total 
shipment values for assembled grain. Although the question of what would be an optimal maize 
price is beyond the scope of this value chain analysis, high producer prices reduce the country’s 
overall competitiveness, both in domestic markets for maize as an import substitute and in 
potential export markets as well.  
  







































Figure 14: Comparison of maize SV at farm level and parity prices (USD/ton)  
 
 
63.  As shown in Figure 14, compared to other countries in the region and elsewhere, Malawi 
is a high cost producer of maize. Compared with neighboring Mozambique, for example, it costs 
more than three times as much to produce a ton of maize in Malawi. Similarly, compared with 
family and emerging commercial farmers in Zambia, Malawi also has higher costs. Only in the 
case of Cameroon, where the models were based on production in a remote inland area with high 
fertilizer costs, are the costs for family sector farmers similar to those in Malawi. There are 
minimal benefits that may be obtained from use of open pollinated maize varieties (OPV) and 
small-scale irrigation. 
 
65.  The next two charts in Figure 15 show the build- up of total SV for FAM-low maize at 
import and export parity prices including farm-level and into-mill assembly costs. In this case, the 
same overall pattern applies to OPV, FAM-high, and irrigated maize and these data are not 
needed to illustrate the value chain cost build-up. 
66.  In the first chart, trader profits are based on an import parity price of USD 379 per MT, 
the total profits paid to the trader with an import parity price amount to USD 117 (MWK 16,380) 
per MT. In actual fact, however, these profits are likely to be shared between multiple traders and 
are sometimes captured by farmers themselves to the extent individual producers are able to play 
an assembly roll by selling maize. The analysis also shows relatively high maize producer prices 
at the farm-gate (see Figure 14, second graph). At MWK45/kg and above, Malawi’s maize 
producer price is higher than in most of the comparator countries and suggests that maize 
production may become a more profitable enterprise for the producer. But such high producer 
prices equally contribute to higher food costs for urban consumers, inflate the total SV for 
assembled grain, and ultimately dampen the prospects for trade competitiveness.  
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A. The Subsidy Program 
67.  The Malawi Government, through the Ministry of Agriculture has been implementing the 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Program since 2005/06.
11 These programs are meant to support 
farmers to afford fertilizer and improved seed and therefore secure improved maize output as a 
food security strategy. During the 2007/08 season, farmers received coupons for 2 bags of 
fertilizer (1 basal, 1 top dress) and free improved maize seed. By design, this was meant to be 
enough to cover 0.1 of a hectare. Only the subsistence poor farmers are eligible to benefit from 
the program. In the analysis, we examined the impact of the program on farm-level net profit and 
competitiveness. The amount of the subsidy in 2007/08 was equivalent to MWK800 (about USD 
6) for a 50kg bag of basal and top-dressing fertilizer. Table 11 summarizes the financial results of 
the farm-level analysis between subsidized and unsubsidized production. 
 
68.    The results indicate considerable gains in farm-level net profits because the subsidy 
increases farmers’ application of fertilizer and use of improved seed at a cheaper cost. All these 
invariably enhance net profits via reduction in production costs. Importantly, however, the input 
subsidy does not increase overall competitiveness of Malawi because the full input costs are still 
borne by the Government.  
 
69.  There are also other supply chain management interventions that could result in reducing 
the cost of agricultural inputs. For example, there is need to consider implementing some 
innovative approaches in the management of fertilizer and inputs supply chains such as timely 
procurement and bulk-buying arrangements with other countries in the region so as to be able to 
get lower prices at the origin.
12 Secondly, there is need to improve fertilizer use efficiency 
through the use of appropriate cropping practices such as conservation farming. Government also 
needs to consider reviewing the fertilizer formulations and blanket recommendations to ensure 
that they reflect area specific circumstances in terms of yield responses as well as the relative 
ratios of input and output prices.   
 
  
                                                      
11 Before then there were other variants of input support programs such as the Starter Pack in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s and the Targeted Inputs Program from 2003/04.  
12 IFDC, following the Africa Fertilizer Summit held in Abuja,  Nigeria in June 2006, has been working on 
modalities of implementing regional bulk buying schemes, of which will involve Malawi, Mozambique, 










B. Maize Competitiveness 
 
70.  Next, Table 12 compares the accumulated SV for rain fed and irrigated maize at 
the assembly level with the most relevant import and export parity prices for Malawi. 
Based on 2007 prices, these data show that Malawi does enjoy a competitive advantage 
in maize as an import substitute, but not for export.. Given the much higher import parity 
price,  Malawi would rather focus on domestic maize production for import substitution and 
should perhaps only target export markets where some specific opportunities emerge to exploit 
seasonal niche for regional trade. Improving the long-term competitiveness of maize as an export 
would likely require investments that reduce the underlying cost of fertilizer to the Malawi 





MWK USD MWK USD
Gross revenue (yield * price) 98,000        700.00        28,000        200.00       
Production costs
  Variable costs 57,900         413.57          16,543          118.16         
  Investment costs (ex. irrigation scheme) 6,747           48.19            1,928            13.77           
  Total costs 64,647        461.77        18,471        131.93       
Farmer income
  Gross margin (revenue - var costs) 40,100        286.43        11,457        81.84         
  Net profit (gross margin - invest costs) 33,353        238.23        9,529          68.07         
Per Hectare Per Ton
FARM PRODUCTION
Hybrid Maize (FAM-high) - subsidy
MWK USD MWK USD
Gross revenue (yield * price) 70,000        500.00        28,000        200.00       
Production costs
  Variable costs 22,200         158.57          8,880            63.43           
  Investment costs 6,747           48.19            2,699            19.28           
  Total costs 28,947        206.77        11,579        82.71         
Farmer income
  Gross margin (revenue - var costs) 47,800        341.43        19,120        136.57       
  Net profit (gross margin - invest costs) 41,053        293.23        16,421        117.29       
Per Hectare Per Ton 
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Table 12: Maize parity price comparison 
 
  Rain fed  Irrigated 
Final SV  USD 261 per ton 
MWK 37 per kg 
USD 257 per ton 
MWK 36 per kg 
Import parity 
(RSA) 
USD 379 per ton 
MWK 53 per kg 
Export parity 
(Zimbabwe) 
USD 269 per ton 





71.  Rice is another important smallholder crop in Malawi, grown mostly in areas along the 
lakeshore. Although the land area (only 3 percent of the area under food crops) and production 
volume (about 3.4 percent of total food production) are small compared to maize, it is widely 
perceived that Malawi has the potential to produce aromatic rice varieties such as Kilombero and 
Faya which can compete favorably with rice from major producing countries such as Thailand. 
Past studies that looked at the costs, profitability and efficiency of rice production have reported 
mixed results about Malawi’s competitiveness in rice production (e.g. Nakhumwa et. al. 1999; 
Keyser et al. 1997). Currently, rice is considered by Government as one of the strategic crops to 
be promoted for import substitution and export. 
 
72.    The value chain analysis for rice covers four levels of production differentiated on the basis 
of rain-fed or irrigated system and farm-level management regimes as shown in Table 13. 
Assembly level costs are based on the cooperative model whereby paddy is transported from the 
farm-gate to the rural warehouse located 30 km away. Assembly costs include bags, storage costs, 
transport and overheads. Processing assumes a 60% out-turn from paddy to polished rice and a 
distance of about 300km from the rural warehouse/mill-gate to the consumer store.  
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Table 13: Rice assumptions 
 
Sector  Yield 






membership, hired ox 
cart to depot, 120 days 
labor (75 days family) 
Cooperative 
marketing 
Co-op buys paddy 











60% outturn for 
polished rice 
packed for retail 
sale 
 
35% outturn for 









Seed, 2x2 fertilizer, 
more insecticide, 
NASFAM 
membership, hired ox 
cart to depot, 150 days 
labor (85 days family) 
Irrigated Rice 
FAM-low 
(irrig)  2.0 




fee, pumping costs, 
hired ox cart to depot, 
150 days labor  
(80 days family)  Same as rain-fed  Same as rain-fed  Same as 
rain-fed 
FAM-high 
(irrig)  3.0 




fee, pumping costs, 
hired ox cart to depot, 
160 days labor  
(85 days family) 





73.  The farm-level indicators resulting from the analysis are shown in Table 14. These were 
obtained from the farmer groups that were visited by the study team. As we will see later, these 
yields are on average lower than those obtained in the other comparator countries such as 
Mozambique and Zambia. 
 
  
MK per MT USD per MT Product Form Location
Farm gate price 35,000         250.00             bagged paddy Nkhotakota
Assembled raw material 38,860         277.57             bagged paddy Regional warehouse
Ex-factory price
Product 1 83,333         595.24             Polished rice (60%) Lillongwe mill
Product 2 -               -                   Rice bran (35%) thrown away
Product 3 -               -                   Trash (5%) thrown away 
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74.  The per ton composition of rice production costs as shown in Figure 14, include fertilizer, 
labor, irrigation and marketing costs. Figure 16 further shows that unlike in maize, higher input 
levels are more profitable and improve competitiveness both under rainfed and irrigated 
conditions.  
 
Figure 16: Rice, composition of farm-level SV 
 
   
 
A. Rice Competitiveness 
75.  When we compare Malawi’s total SV for paddy rice with other countries, Malawi’s is not 
competitive except with Nigeria where prices are protected by trade policy (see Figures 15 and 
16). Farm-gate price for paddy in Malawi is however higher (estimated at about USD250 per ton) 
compared to other countries except Nigeria. These high prices are a benefit to farmers, but 
eventually cause problems for trade competitiveness when the final SV for milled rice is 
compared with import parity. Given such high domestic price, there is little scope for further 
improvement in farm-gate price if Malawi is to achieve competitiveness in rice.  
  
Yield Kg   Price  % Tax as % Total SV Net Profit
(MT/ha) Fertilzer*  (USD/MT)  Foreign DVA (USD/MT) (USD/ha)
Malawi (2007/08)
Rainfed
FAM-low (rain) 1.00 0 250.00         16% 7% 163.10         119.05        
FAM-high (rain) 2.30 200 250.00         45% 13% 153.87         257.53        
Irrigated
FAM-low (irrig) 2.00 100 250.00         36% 15% 222.71         239.40        
FAM-high (irrig) 3.00 200 250.00         41% 15% 177.05       405.83      






































Figure 18: Rice, build-up of financial costs along the value chain 
 
 
Rainfed Rice, FAM-low: Build-up of Financial Costs 
































































































































































































































































































































Farm-level Assembly Processing (60% outturn)
Figure 17: Comparison of paddy rice SV at farm level and parity prices 
(USD/ton) 
 
Rice, Comparison of Farm Gate SV 
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76.  Table 15 shows that Malawi’s polished rice is more costly to produce compared to Thai 
(import parity) or Zambian (export parity) rice. Based on 2007 prices, Malawi’s production cost 
was estimated at about USD570 per ton while the import parity price for Thai rice was estimated 
at USD450 per ton and the export parity price for Zambian rice was estimated at USD480 per ton. 
This implies that Malawi should rather pursue rice production as an import substitution strategy, 
except when there are opportunities to exploit regional market niches. For instance, Malawi may 
specialize in producing special varieties such as Kilombero and Faya which are aromatic, long-
grain and are likely to attract increased demand from millers and consumers compared to other 
varieties. 
 
Table 15: Rice parity price comparison 
  Polished Rice 
Final SV  USD 570 per ton 
MWK 79.8 per kg 
Import parity 
(Thailand) 
USD 450 per ton 
MWK 63.0 per kg 
Export parity 
(Zambia) 
USD 480 per ton 
MWK 67.2 per kg 
 
VII.  BURLEY TOBACCO 
77.  As can be seen in Figure 19, tobacco is the single most important export crop for Malawi, 
contributing over 65 percent in foreign earnings making Malawi one of the world’s most tobacco 
reliant countries. Tobacco alone accounts for 43 percent of the agricultural GDP, 13 percent of 
overall GDP and 23 percent of the country’s total tax revenue. Out of a total workforce of about 5 
million people, over 600,000 people are employed in Malawi’s tobacco sector. The crop occupies 
Irrigated Rice, FAM-low: Build-up of Financial Costs 






































































































































































































































































































































































Farm-level Assembly Processing (60% outturn) 
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122,000 hectares of the 4.6 million hectares under cultivation
13. In 2007, tobacco contributed 53 
percent to the volume of agricultural exports, compared to 9 percent each from sugar and tea, 3 
percent from cotton, and 4 percent from edible nuts. 
 














78.  The analysis of the tobacco value chain covers two levels of burley production, 
differentiated on the basis of management levels. The low management scenario assumes low 
fertilizer application (4 bags each for basal and top-dressing) and low labor intensity on a per 
hectare basis. The high management scenario assumes high fertilizer application (8 bags each of 
basal and top-dressing) and high labor intensity (370 persondays).  The assembly costs include 
curing and baling costs as well as levies and cesses at the Auction Floors. At the processing level, 
we assume a 55 percent conversion from dried leaf to tipped and threshed tobacco that is ready to 
be packed in boxes for delivery at the international market. The main assumptions for the burley 
tobacco farm models used in the analysis are shown in Tables 16 and 17. 
 
Table 16: Burley tobacco assumptions 
Sector  Yield 
(MT/Ha)  Key Inputs  Assembly  Process  Distribute 
FAM-
low  0.9 
4x4 fertilizer on lands, 
some insecticide, hired 
sprayer, delivery to 
TAMA depot, 325 days 
labor (150 days family) 
Transport to floor, 
deductions for 
TAMA, ARET, 
ATC, and AHL 













8x4 fertilizer on lands, 
more insecticide, own 
sprayer, delivery to 
TAMA depot, 370 days 
labor (175 days family) 
Fertilizer use expressed in 50kg bags basal (NPK) x 50kg bags top dressing (urea) per ha. 
                                                      
13 Otanez, M.G. H. Mamudu and S.A. Glantz. Global Leaf Companies Control the Tobacco Market in 































tobacco tea sugar edible nuts
cotton coffee pulses knitted apparel






Table 17: Summary of key data from the farm-level analysis of burley tobacco production 
 
 
79.  As shown in Figure 20, key burley tobacco production costs at the farm-level include 
fertilizer, seed (mainly due to nursery establishment costs), chemicals and labor. Beyond the 
farm-gate, the major cost component is the foreign costs attributed to the high transport costs.  
 




80.  At the assembly level, the major costs that reduce producers’ net profit include the high 
cost of transport and intermediation especially at the assembly level, including the Auction 
Floors. Transport costs to the floors constitute about 9 percent of the total proceeds (see Figure 
FAM-low (standard quality)
MK per MT USD per MT Product Form Location
Farm gate price 148,049       1,057.49          Baled tobacco TAMA depot
Assembled raw material 164,450       1,174.64          Baled tobacco Price at auction
Ex-factory price
Product 1 385,545       2,753.90          Un-boxed T&T (55%) Factory
Product 2 -               -                   Trash Factory
Final traded price
Product 1 511,000       3,650.00          Boxed T&T Tobacco cif Europe
FAM-high (better quality)
MK per MT USD per MT Product Form Location
Farm gate price 163,919       1,170.85          Baled tobacco TAMA depot
Assembled raw material 180,895       1,292.11          Baled tobacco Price at auction
Ex-factory price
Product 1 415,445       2,967.47          Un-boxed T&T (55%) Factory
Product 2 -               -                   Trash Factory
Final traded price
















FAM-low 0.90 400 1,057          50% 14% 759.05        332.89       
FAM-high 1.25 600 1,171          55% 17% 736.65        617.75       
Zambia (2006/07)
FAM 1.25 600 1,200          41% 9% 975.16      443.28     












Low High Low High













21). Other intermediation costs that are levied against the producers’ sales proceeds include 
Auction Holdings (AHL) cess (2.5 percent),  Agricultural Research and Extension Trust (ARET) 
cess (1 percent), Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) cess (0.6 percent), TAMA handling 
charges (0.5 percent) and Tobacco Control Commission re-classification and commission charges 
at 0.3 and 0.1 percent, respectively. Together these charges knock-off about 5 percent from the 
farmers’ proceeds. At processing level, the key costs are overheads and investment (7 percent), 
labor and management (4 percent), repairs and maintenance (4 percent) and energy and machine 
maintenance (8 percent). At the final delivery of the tipped and threshed (T&T) leaf, the main 
costs comprise transport to the final delivery point (9 percent), administration and overheads (9 
percent), interest charges (3 percent) and the cost of boxes that are used to pack the processed 
leaf. 
 
81.  In addition to these costs, there are other hidden costs that are not easy to quantify, but 
nonetheless reduce the net profit for the producers. Such charges include storage charges at the 
rural depots and the costs related to the long waiting time to off-load the tobacco at the floors. On 
average trucks have to wait on long queues for about 2-3 weeks at the floors to off-load. Although 
there is a booking-in system which is meant to reduce waiting time, the system is marred by 
irregularities and inefficiencies that undermine the principal of first in first out. Thirdly, the 
producers also have to wait for weeks before receiving their sales proceeds.   
 
Figure 21: Burley, composition of assembly costs (%) 
 
 
82.  Figure 22 shows the build- up of the financial costs along the entire value chain from 
production to the international export market for processed leaf.  This is a complex chain with 
costs at many levels and with very few obvious entry points for possible cost reductions. The 
costs related to cesses, levies and taxes were already substantially reduced following the Tobacco 
sector reforms undertaken in 2005 (Jaffe 2003; World Bank 2008). There is therefore little scope 
to further reduce these costs. The overhead costs at the processing and exportation levels are 
commensurate with the services provided, especially given the high cost of machine maintenance, 
fuel and electricity. This study has not done a detailed de-bundling of the overheads to be able to 
objectively suggest whether there may be scope in reducing these. The only cost element in which 
significant cost reduction may be possible is in the tobacco transport system. As seen from the 
Burley FAM-low


























cost build up, transport cost is quite significant at all levels along the value chain. According to 
sector experts, the tobacco transport system is the most costly mainly due to inefficiencies in the 
tobacco marketing system.  
 






Burley Tobacco, FAM-Low Build-up of Financial Costs 







































































































































































































































































































Farm-level Assembly and Auction Processing (convert to T&T
at 55%)
Export
Burley Tobacco, FAM-high Build-up of Financial Costs 














































































































































































































































































































A. Burley Tobacco Competitiveness 
 
83.  In spite of the high costs along the tobacco value chain, Malawi’s burley tobacco is still 
internationally competitive. As shown in Table 18, the final SV for both FAM-low and FAM-
high value chains is lower than the export parity (cif Northern Europe). However, the competitive 
edge is now quite narrow. It needs to be consolidated by adopting the improvements suggested 
above, and by helping farmers to adopt improved management systems so as to improve the 
productivity which is still low compared to other countries such as Zambia. The Government, the 
tobacco growers associations, and the private sector need to consider necessary reform and 
investment required to enhance more competitive/streamlined tobacco marketing and transport 
system.  
 
Table 18: Burley tobacco parity price comparison 
 
  FAM-low  FAM-high 
Final SV  
(boxed T&T tobacco) 
USD 3,573 per ton 
MWK 500.2 per kg 
USD 3,786 per ton 
MWK 530.4 per kg 
Export Parity 
(cif Northern Europe) 
USD 3,650 
MWK 511.0 per kg 
USD 3,800 
MWK 532.0 per kg 
 
 
84.  In order to consolidate the competitive edge in burley tobacco, there is need to help 
farmers adopt improved management through institutional innovations such as contract farming 
which have proven to work elsewhere. There is also need for interventions aimed at improving 
the tobacco marketing system so as to roll back some of the efficiency gains to producers. 
 
85.  Through discussions with some tobacco sector stakeholders, a number of suggestions on 
cost cutting measures were explored to improve the tobacco marketing system. First is the need 
for Government to consider opening up to competition in the auctioning of tobacco. This would 
entail making provisions for the entry of other auctioneers. Currently, there is already demand 
among private sectors players who are interested to provide alternative tobacco auction services. 
However, this would entail the review of the Tobacco Act CAP 65:02 and the Control of Tobacco 
and Auction Floors Act CAP 65:03. Government, with support from the World Bank, had already 
initiated such reforms in 2007, but the Ministry of Agriculture in coordination with the Ministry 
of Justice is yet to prepare the draft bills for legislation.  
 
Secondly, there is need to increase tobacco contract farming and marketing arrangements. 
Highly innovative contract farming schemes have already emerged in the sector and are 
discussed further in chapter 6 of the Agriculture Background Paper (one of the background 
papers produced for the Country Economic Memorandum). Adopting them more broadly would 
reduce the volume of auctioned tobacco since contracted tobacco is sold directly to the 
contractors (though it still passes through the auction floors), but in principle by-passes the 
auctioning system. Although, Government, through TCC started to implement the contracting 





Thirdly, there are suggestions to introduce more rural satellite auction markets which will 
invariably reduce the congestion at the three main auction markets in Lilongwe, Mzuzu and 
Limbe. Currently, there are 4 satellite markets that have been in operation for the past 2 years. 
There is need to increase the number, but this requires collateral investments by the private sector 
players, through some form of private-public partnerships.   
VIII. COTTON 
 
86.  Cotton is one of the Government of Malawi’s declared strategic crops. Government aims 
to promote cotton production as a way of broadening its agricultural export base. Prospects in 
cotton production have for the past decade been hampered by poor incentives on the market in 
terms of low prices and limited profits, mainly due to fewer ginners on the market
14. The cotton 
sector has about 120,000 smallholder farmers, three ginning companies and three main input 
providers. Up until 2003/04, cotton yields averaged about 600 kg/ha, but since then, through a 
number of emerging cotton development initiatives and the slight increase in the ginners, average 
yield has improved to about 900 kg/ha and production has considerably increased to about 50,000 
MT in 2007/08 season (see Table 18).   
 
87.  The increased production response after 2003/04 was as a result of the establishment of 
the Cotton Development Association (CDA) involving the major ginners. The CDA provided 
treated seed and pesticides to cotton farmers under contract farming arrangements. A further 
important change was the improved ginning out turn (GoT) up from 33% to 38%, which 
improves the overall crop value as lint is significantly more valuable than seed. Due to these 
positive developments, Cotton is now the fourth biggest crop by value. There is also realistic 
potential to double the volume and value in the coming years, through the initiatives to improve 
cotton seed, adoption of Bt-cotton (after the initial trials) and ensure fairness and transparency in 
setting prices. Partly, the bright prospects are also a result of the improvements in the cotton price 
on the international market (see Table 20) and the favorable incentives being provided by the 
ginners that ensure that increase in international prices is passed through to the cotton producers. 
 
Table 19:  Malawi cotton production (metric tons) 
 




Seed cotton   14,700  33,000  45,000 46,000 43,000 50,000 
Lint (avg. 38%)  5,600  12,540  17,100 19,760 16,340 19,500 
Cottonseed (avg. 
57%) 
9,100 18,810  25,650 29,640 24,510 28,000 
Source: Kadale Consultants, 2007 
 
  
                                                      
14 From 2007/08 season, Government started to intervene in cotton markets by setting minimum prices (at a 
level higher than parity).   
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Table 20: International cotton prices 
 
 
Domestic road freight = MWK 12 per km in 2006; MWK 15 per km in 2007; 20 per km in 2008. 
 
88.  In analyzing the cotton value chain, we considered two production levels differentiated 
on the basis of low and high management as shown in Table 21. Low management implies use of 
un-treated seed, no application of fertilizer and limited use of pesticides. High management 
implies use of treated seed and application of fertilizer and chemicals at the recommended rates. 
In both scenarios, both hired and family labor is used since almost all the cotton in Malawi is 
produced by smallholder farmers. The analysis assumes a ginning-out-turn (GOT) of 38.5%. 
 
89.  The farm-level cost elements for cotton include labor, fertilizer (for high management), 
chemicals, marketing costs and depreciation of the capital equipment such as sprayers. At the 
high input level, it is assumed that the ginner makes an additional investment in improved 
extension and other out-grower services beyond the very basic types of support offered now. 
Specifically, it was assumed that at the (current) low-input level, the ginner spends only USD 
1.02 per hectare (equal to MWK 239 or USD 1.71 per MT seed cotton) whereas at the improved, 
high-input level the ginner invests and estimated USD 5.53 per hectare (equal to MWK 861 or 
USD 6.15 per ha per MT seed cotton) on farmer extension and other out-grower services.  
 
Table 21: Cotton assumptions 
 
Sector  Yield 
(MT/Ha)  Farm  Assembly  Process 
FAM-low 0.6 
Fuzzy seed, no fertilizer, 
limited pesticides with 
hired sprayer, 118 days 
labor  
(93 days family) 















comparison for lint at 
gin gate, excluding 
revenue from seed) 
FAM-high 0.9 
Treated seed, 1x1 fertilizer, 
recommended pesticides, 
own sprayer, 123 days 
labor (83 days family) 




90.  The analysis also took into account the Government of Malawi (GOM) minimum seed 
cotton price in 2007/08 which was set at MWK 65 per kg with 2-3% deduction from gross sales 
Dec 06 Oct 07 June 08 Dec 06 Oct 07 June 08
Cotlook Index A  (per lb) 0.59            0.68            0.78            83               95               109            
Conversion to metric tons  1,309.18     1,492.11  1,719.12  183,285    208,895    240,677     
Less sea freight to Nacala (per MT) 210.00        220.00        230.00        29,400        30,800        32,200       
Less road freight to Blantyre (per MT) 68.00          85.00          96.00          9,520          11,900        13,440       
Less road freight to Gin (per MT) 19.20          24.00          32.00          2,688          3,360          4,480         
Malaw gin gate lint revenue (fob per MT) 1,011.98     1,163.11  1,361.12  141,677    162,835    190,557     
USD MWK
MK per MT USD per MT Product Form Location
Farm gate price 63,830         455.93             Baled seed cotton Farm depot
Assembled raw material 65,469         467.64             Baled seed cotton Into ginnery
Ex-factory price
Lint 162,835       1,163.11          Lint (38.5%) ex Ginnery
Seed 10,500         75.00               Seed (57%) ex Ginnery
Trash -               -                   Trash (4.5%) ex Ginnery 
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for outgower costs (in the analysis we have assumed 2% deduction). At the assembly level, 
because of vertical integration, price was set equal to total accumulated costs (i.e. calculate total 
profits at processing stage only). Table 22 compares Malawi’s farm-gate indicators to those of 
other countries. 





91.  The cost composition of cotton at the farm, assembly and processing levels are as shown 
in Figure 23. The farm-level cost elements for cotton include labor, fertilizer (for high 
management), chemicals, marketing costs and depreciation of the capital equipment such as 
sprayers. At the high input level, it is assumed that the ginner makes an additional investment in 
improved extension and other out-grower services beyond the very basic types of support offered 
now. Specifically, the ginner is assumed to spend USD 2.67 per hectare or USD 3.36 total per 
hectare (equal to MWK 574 or USD 4.10 per MT seed cotton) in out-grower services. As shown, 
this table also includes data from an analysis of the so-called “yield program” operated by 
Dunavant Cotton in the Eastern Province of Zambia just across the border from Malawi. Unlike 
the high-input model in Malawi, which relies on fertilizer to achieve high yield results, the 
Zambia “yield program” is based primarily on farmer extension to help growers understand the 
importance of panting date and to carry out pest scouting to achieve the maximum benefit from 
expensive insecticides.  
 
  
% Tax as % Total SV Net Profit
Foreign DVA (USD/MT) (USD/ha)
Malawi (2007/08)
FAM-low 25% 11% 232.69           173.80          
FAM-high 46% 15% 262.68           209.55          
Cameroon (2007)
FAM-low 21% 10% 477.78           85.28            
FAM-high 28% 13% 384.56           93.61            
Mozambique (2006/07)
FAM 17% 1.6% 120.44           76.67            
ECF 27% 2.4% 83.60             121.44          
Nigeria (2006)
FAM n/a n/a 255.00           63.33            
Zambia (2005/06)
FAM 25% 6% 181.75           148.00          
ECF 27% 4% 234.17           152.33          
Zambia (2006/07)
FAM-low 24% 9% 277.24           56.41            
FAM-high 36% 10% 286.28           37.84            
Yield program 21% 9% 183.62           163.66          
Brazil (2006)
LCF 20% 27% 447.23         145.55         
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92.  As shown in Figure 24, however, the ginner’s additional spending on extension results in 
the loss of nearly all net profit at the processing stage when producers are paid the GOM 
minimum price. This begs the important question of whether a better policy option would be to 
allow ginners to pay a lower price and use the savings to invest in farmer extension and other out-
grower services that could improve long-term competitiveness.  
 








Low High Yield Low High Yield
Malawi Zambia Malawi Zambia 
































A. Cotton Competitiveness 
 
93.  The estimated SV for un-ginned seed cotton for Malawi is lower than other countries 
except Mozambique and Nigeria as shown in Figure 25.  This implies that Malawi has some 
competitive edge against its neighbors in the production of cotton, and subsequently the 
exportation of lint. However, the competitive edge would still be much stronger if the domestic 
price for un-ginned cotton was not very high (at MWK65/kg as per the Government set minimum 
Cotton, FAM-Low Build-up of Financial Costs 


















































































































































































































































































Farm-level Assembly Processing (38.5% GOT)
Cotton, FAM-high Build-up of Financial Costs 


















































































































































































































































































Farm-level Assembly and Auction Processing (convert at 55%) 
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price). In the value chain analysis, this high price is compensated for by reducing the ginner’s 
investment in out-grower extension and other services, thereby threatening the sustainability of 
high quality and productivity in the cotton sub-sector. 
 




94.  When we compare the total SV against the export parity, as shown in Table 23, Malawi’s 
competitive edge is very narrow. In fact the results indicate that in 2006 and 2007, ginners may 
have been uncompetitive. Among other reasons, this is due to the high producer price and the low 
ginning-out-turn (GOT).  
 
Table 23: Comparison of final cotton SV and parity prices 
 
 
95.  As shown in Table 24, one of the ways to consolidate and sustain competitiveness in 
cotton is to improve the ginning out turn (GOT). A 1% improvement in the GOT substantially 
lowers per unit ginning costs and thus enhances the ginners’ profit. This is an area that provides 
the greatest scope in terms of improving the ginner’s profit which could then be rolled-back to the 
net farmer profit through investment in services required to improve the quality and yield of seed 
cotton and lint. GOT may easily be improved at the farm-level through the use of treated seed, 
improving the use of chemicals through appropriate scouting for pests so as to ensure timely 
application of chemicals, avoiding contamination of the seed cotton at picking, sorting,  baling as 
well as transportation to the ginnery. At the gin-gate, GOT may be improved by use of better gins 
and avoiding contamination through better grading and handling techniques. With the GOM’s 
current pricing policy whereby nearly all profits in the cotton value chain accrue to farmers, 
however, there is little scope for ginners to invest in improved farmer extension or upgrading of 
ginning facilities.  
 
  
Cotton, Comparision of Farm Gate SV
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Final SV Dec 06 Oct 07 June 08 Dec 06 Oct 07 June 08
FAM-low 1,353          (341.30)       (190.16)       7.85           
FAM-high 1,360          (347.66)       (196.53)       1.48           
1,361.12    
Export  Parity Competitiveness Gap/Edge
1,011.98     1,163.11     
47 
 
Table 24: Improvement in GOT and returns to cotton 
Ginning Outturn  
(% lint) 
Ginner’s Profit 
(USD per MT seed cotton) 

















IX. REVIEW OF OTHER VALUE CHAINS AND RELATED STUDIES 
96.  For the sake of completeness, we reviewed a number of value chain studies undertaken in 
Malawi during the last five years. We reviewed studies on completed value chains for dairy, 
poultry, tea, sugar, fish farming, cassava, coffee and horticultural products, especially paprika 
(see Koester et. al 2004; RATES 2003; Agar et al. 2007; 2008; GoM 2008; World Bank 2008). 
There are important variations in most of these studies in terms of scope and methodologies. For 
example, while our methodology considers the entire length of the chain from input supply to 
distribution of the final processed (or semi-processed) commodity, most of the studies reviewed 
only concentrate on some parts of the value chain. Most studies focus on the mapping of supply 
chains and describe the costs along the chain, but do not benchmark the domestic costs with 
parity prices. As a result most of the studies do not assess competitiveness. The results from these 
studies are summarized in Table 25
15. 
 
97.  However, notwithstanding these differences, most studies arrive at similar conclusions in 
terms of the key factors that affect Malawi’s agricultural trade performance. Cost of inputs, 
transport and trader margins feature highly. Apart from tobacco, the other value chains that have 
promising prospects include sugar, dairy and poultry (for import substitution) and horticulture.   
 










Dairy  2008  Domestic production still low (at only 60% 
of demand) and uncompetitive. As such 
Malawi makes up through imports of UHT 
and powdered milk. To promote local 
production, there is need improve animal 
husbandry techniques, improve access to 
feed and artificial insemination. There is 
also need to promote hygiene and cooling 
facilities at milk bulking group level. 
Cassava Value Chains 
in Nkhotakota, 
Salima and Lilongwe 
Cassava  2008  Cassava production is less costly and 
competitive than maize. Due to shorter 
shelf life, net farm profit increases if 
farmers produce for processing into starch 
and other adhesives.  There is need to 
formalize standards with the Malawi 
                                                      
15 See Koester et al. (2004); RATES, (2003); Kadale Consultants, (2007); (2008), MoAFS (2008/09).  
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Bureau of Standards in order to access 
regional and international markets  
Adaptation Strategy 
for Malawian Sugar 
Industry in Response 
to the Reform of the 
European Union 
Sugar Regime  
Sugar  2006  Malawi’s sugar is among the most 
competitive in the region. Since there is an 
increasing number of small producers 
through out-grower schemes, there is need 
to enhance extension services to ensure 
compliance to EU standards, which is the 
major export market for Malawi’s sugar.  
Tea Sector Finance 
Study for Food 
Security 
Tea  2007  Not so competitive due to low yields from 
old Indian plantations. There is need to 
promote replanting with high yielding 
clonal varieties at both the smallholder and 
estate levels. 
Coffee Sector Finance 
Study 
Coffee  2007  This study used the coffee value chain to 
gain a better understanding of how the 
commercial growers/processors and 
smallholder coffee growers are currently 
financing their activities. Production levels 
are currently low and being threatened by 
lack of capital.  
Horticultural 
Marketing and Food 




2008  Lack of processing capacity, direct flights 
and high cost of air freightare some of the 
major set-backs to promotion of 
horticulture in Malawi. This results in lack 




Groundnuts  2008  Prospects for groundnuts as a tradable crop 
have been affected by lack of high yielding 
and rosette resistant varieties. Sector 
prospects are likely to improve with the 
release of a new variety that has right 
kernel sizes and is resistant to diseases. 
Final Evaluation of 







2007  Same as for coffee, tea and horticulture. 
Review of the Poultry 
Industry in Malawi 
Broilers and 
layers 
2007  Many informal small sector players who 
face high costs of production due to the 
increase in feed costs. The ban on imports 
due to avian flu has also exacerbated the 
increases in the domestic price of chicken 
meat and eggs thereby making it 
uncompetitive. There is need to promote 
medium and large scale production 
systems. 
Status and prospects 
of Malawi’s tobacco 
industry: a value 
chain analysis 
Tobacco 2004  Malawi  enjoys competitiveness in tobacco 
but there is need to improve the efficiency 
of its marketing system so as to consolidate 
its competitiveness   
49 
 
Cotton textile apparel 
value chain report 
Cotton  2003  Malawi’s cotton was not competitive due to 
the low ginning out-turn (GOT) estimated 
at 33-35%; and high polypropylene 
contamination which reduced Malawi’s 
cotton lint on the international market 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, various reports. 
 
X.    KEY FACTORS AFFECTING AGRICULTURAL COMPETITIVENESS 
98.  There are four main factors that seem to explain Malawi’s narrow range of 
competitiveness against other countries: These include: (i) low productivity, (ii) high cost of 
agricultural inputs, (iii) high cost of transport and (iv) high trader margins at the assembly level.  





99.  In general, crop yields in Malawi are lower than in other comparator countries. The yield 
gap against other countries is more significant in maize, rice and tobacco as can be seen in Figure 
26. For example, Malawi’s maize yield at smallholder level is only comparable to Mozambique, 
Nigeria and Cameroon, but is only half as much compared to Zambia, Brazil and Thailand. In 
cotton, available data indicates that Malawi’s yield is quite comparable against other countries, 
with the exception of Cameroon and Brazil, where the yield is higher. Similarly, rice yield is only 
comparable to Nigeria and to some limited extent Zambia, but in general lower than all the other 
countries including Mozambique. Smallholder burley tobacco yield for Malawi is only better than 
that of Nigeria. Malawi’s agro-climatic conditions are less similar with countries such as Brazil, 
Cameroon, Thailand and Nigeria. The analysis assumes similar levels of crop management and 
agro-climatic conditions, more especially for Zambia and Mozambique where agro-climatic 
conditions are not markedly different from those of Malawi.    
 
  Source: FAOSTAT 
 







Malawi Mozambique Zambia  Nigeria Cameroon Brazil Thailand
ton/ha
Maize  Cotton Rice  Tobacco 
50 
 
100.  We however attribute the low crop yields to the low levels of fertilizer intensity and use 
of low yielding crop varieties, mostly as a result of the high cost of agricultural inputs in Malawi 
compared to other countries. In land abundant countries such as Mozambique, the yield 
difference could also be attributed to differences in the natural fertility of the soils.  
 
High cost of agricultural inputs 
 
101.  Malawi is a relatively high cost country in terms of agricultural inputs.  As shown in 
Table 26, Malawi’s costs for fertilizer and other agricultural inputs are generally higher than most 
comparator countries. Malawi’s cost advantage lies only in the cheaper labor. Clearly Malawi can 
only compete based on its labor cost advantage, and this has been confirmed in almost all the 
value chains analyzed.  
 













   MT  Liter  1ha cotton  1 day FAM  1MT per Km 
Malawi (2006)  532.82  -  -  -  - 
Malawi (2007)  728.57  7.14  14.29  0.71  0.129 
Mozambique (2006)  377.60  5.00  25.02  0.48  0.070 
Zambia (2007)  540.00  5.00  29.28  1.25  0.100 
Nigeria (2006)  295.45  5.15 8.56  2.65  0.053 
Cameroon (north) (2007)  702.19  7.00  45.83  3.13  0.115 
Brazil (2006)  301.40  3.49  30.18  20.88  0.064 
Thailand (2006)  346.60  3.59  n/a  n/a  0.027 
Notes: Fertilizer price for most common blend in each country; Herbicide price for paraquat, round-up or similar 
product used for general weed burn-down. 
Insecticides for cotton = 1ha FAM-high in Malawi and Cameroon; 1ha FAM in Nigeria; 1ha ECF in Mozambique, 
and Zambia; and 1ha LCF in Brazil. Actual quantities of insecticide will vary. 
Transport costs in Cameroon for direct shipping method (can go to USD 0.54 per MT per km if use informal 
roadside freight). Slightly lower rates prevail in southern Cameroon because of proximity to refinery. 
Input prices in Cameroon are 10-15% higher in north than in the south due to transport costs and other fees. 
 
102.  Fertilizer is the single most important cost component in the production of most arable 
crops. The analysis shows that it accounts for 20 – 50 percent of the farm-level costs of 
production for all crops considered in the analysis. In 2007, Malawi’s fertilizer cost, estimated at 
USD 728.57 per ton, was almost twice as expensive compared to Mozambique, Nigeria, Brazil 
and Thailand (see Figure 8). The cost of herbicide and insecticides was also equally high 
(although the insecticide cost is not so high).  
 
103.  Malawi imports all its fertilizer and other agricultural inputs. Domestic blending and/or 
production capacity is very limited. As such, the high cost of fertilizer is mainly due to the high 
international and domestic transports costs, estimated at 22 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 
Furthermore, domestic dealer mark-ups are also quite high in Malawi, estimated at 16 percent 
compared to 5 percent or less in Zambia and Mozambique. Given that fertilizer is a major 
component of farm costs, the domestic price levels have a major bearing on final competitiveness, 
not just in terms of accumulated SV at the point of final competition, but also in terms of the 
influence on farmer decision making and yield expectation.   
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104.  As shown in section III on input analysis, the major cost element that inflates the 
domestic price of agricultural inputs is the high international and domestic transport cost. As seen 
in Table 6, in 2006/07 season, transport cost alone (both international and domestic) contributed 
over 33 percent to the fertilizer price build-up. The wholesaler and retailer mark-ups together 
contributed nearly 20 percent to the fertilizer price build-up. Transport cost is therefore a key 
determinant of Malawi’s agricultural competitiveness, given that most agricultural commodities 
are primary or semi-processed and are therefore bulky and attract high transport costs, on 
average. 
 
105.  We further analyzed the differences in the composition of domestic fertilizer prices 
between 2007 and 2008. In 2008 world fertilizer price spiked to unprecedented levels which had a 
major impact on domestic prices in the 2008/09 agricultural season, not least of all because most 
domestic importers (including the government under its own fertilizer subsidy program) happen 
to make their purchases each year at almost the same time in the season when global prices were 
at their highest. Between 2007 and 2008, the typical retail price at the start of the agricultural 
season for a 50 bag of urea increased from MWK 3,800 (USD 27.14) to more than MWK 7,400 
(USD 52.86).  
106.  The price increase in 2008 meant that the price at origin increased from 54% to 62% of 
the farm gate SV. Apart from negotiating for better international prices through forward contracts 
or other improved supply arrangements, including early procurement, Malawi has very limited 
scope to influence the farm gate price of its agricultural inputs, more especially inorganic 
fertilizer. Investments in improved distribution networks for fertilizer and domestic blending 
could help, but compared to changes in foreign costs, these investments could only have limited 
impact on agriculture competitiveness.  
107.  Although Malawi does not impose any direct tax on fertilizer in the form of customs duty 
or VAT, the analysis reveals that domestic taxes still accounted for around 8% of total farm gate 
SV. Specifically, these taxes include VAT on clearing fees, fuel taxes, trading licenses, and profit 
tax charged on dealer mark-ups. As a strategy to improve agriculture competitiveness, therefore, 
there may be some scope to reduce these specific charges pertaining to fertilizer import and trade. 
108.  We also examined the cost of improved seed, more especially the farm and assembly-
level costs of hybrid seed production. This was primarily undertaken to derive the conversion 
factors required by the spreadsheet methodology for the analysis of smallholder hybrid maize. 
Information on this specialized activity is based on a simple average from models provided by 
two major commercial seed companies. Given this limitation, the results should not be interpreted 
as a definitive picture of the costs and returns to seed multiplication, but only as a snapshot view 
of structural composition of the main costs in seed multiplication.  
109.  Seed multiplication in Malawi, as elsewhere, requires strict adherence to management 
guidelines and is therefore mainly undertaken by large and medium-scale estates with a 
commercial outlook rather than by smallholders. In the analysis, we modeled two companies that 
use imported foundation (mainly from South Africa) which is then multiplied on contract by 
farmers with the capacity to cultivate a minimum of 10 hectares. There is no provision for loans 
and most growers are within 200km of Lilongwe. Farm-level data for the hybrid seed 
multiplication model is based on an average yield of 7MT/ha and price to the farmer of MWK 
49,350 (USD 352.50) per MT. The results show that on a 10ha minimum plot size, the grower’s 
total variable costs work out to nearly USD 16,000 (MWK 2.24 million).  Table 27 shows that the 
total SV for packed seed ready to use is USD840 per ton (equivalent to nearly MWK120/kg). 
Given that mark-ups, domestic duties and taxes constitute a considerable portion of the domestic  
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costs, some further examination of factory costs, utility costs (including the cost of power 
disruptions), taxes on imported seed dressing, and taxes on other business operating are areas 
where possible savings could be achieved. Rents by the seed companies on imported foundation 
seed also appear significant and could be an area where Malawi research institutes could play a 
more dynamic and active role in helping to bring down the cost of such important agricultural 
inputs. 
Table 27: Indicative costs of hybrid seed multiplication in Malawi 
 
 
High transport costs 
 
110.  Given the importance of transport cost element in all the value chains analyzed, we 
examined in detail the major causes of high transport costs in Malawi, compared to other 
countries in similar situations. One of the key causes of high transport costs to and within Malawi 
is the high cost of fuel relative to other countries. As shown in Table 8, the retail price of petrol 
was MWK251/litre (equivalent to USD1.50/liter) which is very high compared to Botswana (also 
a landlocked country) whose petrol price on February 2, 2009 was Pula 4.35/liter or equivalent to 
USD0.58/ liter.  This implies that even with the reduced price of MWK213/liter (prices were 
reduced in February 2009 following a public outcry), Malawi’s petrol price is 3 times higher than 
that of Botswana, a country with a per capita income which is about 23 times higher than that of 
Malawi.   
 
111.  The factors contributing to the high fuel price in Malawi include the multiple levels of 
levies and surcharges imposed by various agencies including Malawi Energy Regulatory 
Authority, Road Fund Administration, Bureau of Standard, etc., on the FOB price of fuel (see 
Table 28).  These levies constitute about 40 percent of the retail pump price.  The second and the 
third major factors are the taxes and duties collected by Ministry of Finance, as well as the profit 
margin of wholesale and retailers, representing about 13 percent and 12 percent of the retail price, 
respectively. The insurance and handling charges only add up to about 6 percent of the retail 
pump price. Thus, a rationalization of the levies and taxes on fuel are likely to lead into 
significant reductions in transport costs, which is likely to improve trade competitiveness in 
general, and agricultural competitiveness in particular.  
 
  
M W KU S DM W KU S D
Domestic Value Added
Costs & mark-ups 8,183           58.45           57,306         409.33        
Official duties & tax 4,797           34.27           18,726         133.76        
Additional costs -               -               -               -              
Total DVA 12,981         92.72           76,032       543.09      
Foreign costs 24,806         177.19         41,568         296.91        
Total Shipment Value 37,787         269.91         117,600     840.00      
PRODUCT READY FOR USE
FARM GATE PACKED SEED 
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Table 28: Petroleum product price build-up in Malawi - Kwacha/liter (effective December 
1, 2008) 
 








FOB  price  64.31 69.02 71.34 
Railage (10 days)  0.72  0.73  1.76 
Road freight (4-5 days)  12.71  12.22  10.36 
INS/  handling    0.88 0.85 0.59 
Losses  0.51 0.53 0.49 
IBLC  (BT/LL)  79.12 83.36 84.54 
Energy Regulatory Levy (MERA collection)  0.41  0.37  0.29 
Road Levy  (Road Fund collection)  13.70  11.70  -- 
Safety  Net  Levy    7.00 7.00 4.00 
MBS CESS  (Bureau of Standard collection)  0.16  0.17  0.17 
Energy Fund (Min. Energy and Natural Resources  collection)  0.50 0.40 0.40 
Price stabilization fund (MERA collection)  86.20 70.50 38.26 
PRICE AFTER LEVIES but BEFORE  DUTY  187.09 173.50 127.66 
Duty  7.91 8.34 4.23 
Excise  duty  25.24 27.51 13.31 
PRICE INCLUDING DUTY  220.24  209.34  145.21 
Distribution  Margin  2.33 2.33 2.33 
Gross Margin  16.55  11.55  9.81 
WHOLESALE  PRICE  239.12 223.22 157.35 
Retail Margin  12.08  11.28  7.95 
PUMP PRICE (Kwacha per liter)  251.20 234.50 165.30  
54 
 
High trader margins 
 
112.  Findings from the analysis suggest proportionately high margins that accrue to traders at 
the assembly level, especially in maize, rice and tobacco. For maize and rice, there are high 
margins at the assembly and processors/millers, respectively. For tobacco, there are high transport 
costs at assembly level which emanate primarily from a somewhat less efficient marketing 
system. For illustrative purposes, we have chosen to use the findings for maize where trader 
margins and other marketing costs along the chain are very high proportional to the volume of 
grain handled by traders relative to producers. 
 
113.  We examined maize traders’ profit margin (per metric ton) at import parity and found 
that it is very high compared to the profit that accrues to the producer. Given that on average 
traders handle more volume that producers, the traders’ margin is quite high.  
 
114.  The higher trader margins are attributed to the thin maize markets, resulting mainly from 
the high transaction risks in the remote areas that often limit competition. As such only few 
traders with transport facilities are able to reach remote areas where they reap monopolistic rents. 
Through appropriate interventions that improve the development of private traders, thereby 
enhancing the structure of maize and rice markets, it is possible that some of the margins that are 
captured by the traders could be passed on to the producers thereby improving the farm-gate 
prices. 
 
How to improve agricultural competitiveness and producer’s net profit 
 
115.  On the basis of the four key constraints to agricultural competitiveness, the analysis 
suggests several interventions that may improve competitiveness and producer’s net profit, 
especially at the smallholder level. The suggested interventions derive from an assessment of the 
estimated impact of a number of simulations on competitiveness and farmers’ net profits. Table 
29 shows how these simulations are implemented within the analytical framework and the results 
are summarized in Box 1.  
Table 29: Simulations and how they are implemented 
 
Simulation  How it is implemented 
Technological improvements  10% increase in yield for all crops 
1% improvement in GOT in cotton  
Reduction in farm-level input costs (through the 
subsidy program) 
Use the subsidized price of fertilizer and no cost for 
improved seed (for the low management scenario) 
Trader margins and transport costs  Stepwise reduction in fuel costs and trader margins by 5% 
(directly applied on the farm-gate price)  
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Box 1: Three ways to improve farm-level returns: A simulation 
The impact of three simulations of changes in key factors affecting Malawi's agricultural competiveness are evaluated. 
These are (i) a technological improvement leading to a 10 percent increase in yield and a percent improvement in GOT 
in cotton; (ii) a reduction in farm-level input costs through a 5 percent change in face value of the fertilizer and seed 
voucher; and a reduction in trader margins and marketing cost through a five percent stepwise reduction in transport 
cost and trader margins.  
The impact of yield improvements.  The impact of yield increases as a result of technological improvements on 
producers’ net profit and farm-level competitiveness are shown in Table 1.  The results generally indicate that, other 
things being equal, a 10 percent improvement in yield results in raising producers’ net profit by as much as 35-55 
percent in hybrid maize, about 25 percent in cotton, 10 percent in rice and between 13-17 percent in burley tobacco.  
The yield improvements also result in an improvement in farm-level competitiveness ranging from 9 to 22 percent.  
These results come from simple simulations that assume linearity and do not consider the general equilibrium effects of 
yield changes on output prices. Perhaps, if such market effects were considered through general equilibrium analysis, 
the magnitude of the positive impacts would somehow be reduced.  However, the results imply that one way to 
improve farm profits and competitiveness is via technological improvements that improve crop yields.   
Impact of agricultural input subsidy.  This particular simulation is implemented only on the crops that have been 
included in the current input subsidy program i.e. low input maize, low input burley tobacco and low input cotton.  The 
cost of fertilizer and seed are changed to reflect the value of the subsidy voucher i.e. market price of fertilizer and seed 
minus the amount paid by the farmer to redeem the voucher. This year, this amount is equivalent to MWK800 (about 
USD 6) for a 50kg bag of basal and top-dressing fertilizer and zero in the case of hybrid maize and cotton seed.  The 
results shown in Table 1 indicate considerably high gains in farm-level net profits and competitiveness because the 
subsidy increases farmers’ application of fertilizer and use of improved seed at a cheaper cost. All these invariably 
enhance profits and private competitiveness via reduction in the costs. Of course they do not increase the 
competitiveness of Malawi as a whole because the costs are still borne by the government.   
Impact of a reduction in transport costs and trader margins.  Trader margins are costs that are incurred mostly at 
the assembly level.  As such, we assume a direct pass-through of the gains in transport cost and trader margin 
reductions to the farm-gate prices.  This implies that if we assume a percentage reduction in the trader margins, such a 
change is applied directly on the farm-gate price.  However, since the transport cost is incurred directly by the farmer, 
the cost reduction is applied directly to the transport parameter in the farm-level crop budget.  The results are as shown 
in Table 1.  Reduction in trader margins considerably increases the producer net profit because it raises the producer 
price.  The impact is directly proportional to the importance of the trader margin in the marketing of respective crops.  
Where the trader margin is quite high as a proportion of the producer price, as in the case of maize, the impact on 
producer net profit is also very high.  Similarly, a reduction in transport costs improves competitiveness more 
particularly in commodities that have to be transported from the farm to the market such as cotton and tobacco.   
Table 30: Impact of various key cost factors on farmers’ net profit and shipment value 
crop  Impact on producer’s net profit 
(% from base) 
Impact on farm-level shipment value 















M a i z e              
       FAM-LOW  65.53  55  17  23  158.35  9  -43  n/a 
       FAM-HIGH    35    37  183.9  5    -0.3 
C o t t o n              
       FAM-LOW  173.80  25  3  11  232.69  13  -2  -0.8 
       FAM-HIGH    14    18  247.7  8    -0.5 
R i c e              
       FAM-LOW  119.1  10    19  163.1  17    n/a 
       FAM-HIGH  112.0  13    12  153.9  12    n/a 
Tobacco             
       FAM-LOW  369.9  17  60  14  759.1  22  -29  -3.1 




XI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
116.  The main findings from this analysis are that Malawi has indicatively some competitive 
advantage in the production and exportation of tobacco and cotton, and that this mostly derives 
from its low labor cost advantage.  
 
117.  Secondly, based on current prices and cost structure, the country does not have 
competitive edge in producing maize and rice for export. Malawi would better pursue an import 
substitution strategy in these cereals, and perhaps only aim at the export market when regional 
market opportunities arise. However, export possibilities for rice may be contingent upon a 
number of strategies such as focusing on aromatic varieties targeting niche markets in the region 
as well as improvement in productivity and efficiency of the value chains especially at the 
assembly and processing levels. 
  
118.  The key factors that underpin Malawi’s narrow competitiveness, and the lack of it in 
some crops include high cost of inorganic fertilizer and other inputs, low productivity and the 
higher trader margins and intermediation costs along the value chains. Inorganic fertilizer and 
other agricultural inputs are costly mainly due to high international and domestic transport costs 
as well as high trader margins as a result of high transaction risks associated with agricultural 
input trading. The high cost of inputs further leads to low uptake of fertilizer and improved seed. 
Overtime, low uptake of improved technology results in under-capitalization in the sector which 
tends to arrest any more technological and institutional innovations. The majority of Malawi’s 
smallholder farmers are trapped in this situation, in which as a result of risk aversion, they choose 
to operate at a sub-optimal subsistence level. 
 
119.  The analysis shows that farm gate prices in Malawi, contrary to popular opinion, are 
often higher than in other countries, and there is little scope for further increases via minimum 
prices. Improvement in total farm income would rather come from productivity improvements 
and a lowering of the production costs. Interventions that aim at setting minimum prices may be 
counter-productive in the long-run because they threaten the provision of important services that 
are provided by players within the value chain. The case of minimum producer prices for seed 
cotton is a good example of this whereby the analysis shows that the GOM pricing policy has left 
ginning companies with very little profit to invest in farmer extension, new processing 
technologies, and other competitiveness improvements that would benefit small farmers and 
sector performance overall.  
 
120.  This analysis suggests a number of interventions aimed at improving agricultural 
competitiveness as a basis for improving farmer returns. First is the need to improve productivity 
through proven technological and institutional innovations that provide an incentive for private 
and public sector investments in agricultural research and development. Secondly, for such 
innovations to benefit farmers, they have to be made accessible to them in a cost-effective way. 
Contract farming arrangements have proven to be effective in bringing technology to farmers 
while at the same time providing better incentives for continued investments.  
 
121.  While productivity gains are probably more important than other cost savings along the 
value chain, there are also other gains to be had through interventions aimed at reducing the cost 
of fertilizer, seed and other agricultural inputs. First, interventions aimed at reducing the transport 
costs, such as for example, rationalization of levies on fuel, reduction in domestic taxes and 
duties, are critical to reducing fertilizer costs in Malawi, thereby raising competitiveness. 
Secondly, there is need to consider implementing some innovative approaches in the management  
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of fertilizer and inputs supply chains such as timely procurement and bulk-buying arrangements 
with other countries in the region so as to be able to get lower prices at the origin. Thirdly, there 
is need for appropriate interventions to improve the development of private traders, thereby 
enhancing the structure of commodity markets, to ensure that some of the margins that are 
captured by the traders, in both the input and output market, could be passed on to the producers 
thereby improving the farm-gate prices.  
 
122.  Finally, it is important to note that consolidation of Malawi’s agricultural competitiveness 
hinges on its ability to meet international commodity standards. The analysis assumes that 
Malawi’s agricultural commodities are purely tradable and are near perfect substitutes for 
internationally traded goods from competing countries. This assumption can grossly be violated if 
Malawi’s agricultural commodities do not meet international standards, more especially for bulky 
commodities such as maize, rice and cotton. 
 
123.  The following are the key messages from the value chain analysis: 
 
  Malawi has a fairly good competitive edge in burley tobacco and cotton. 
  Malawi does not have competitive advantage in maize and rice. The country would better 
promote maize and rice production as an import substitution strategy, except when there 
are opportunities to exploit regional market niches. 
  Malawi’s competitive advantage in tobacco and cotton invariably derives from its low 
relative labor costs, which reinforces the argument in favor of smallholder agriculture. 
  Competitiveness in all crops is dampened by low productivity on the one hand and high 
input costs, high transport costs and trader margins, on the other.  
  High transport costs and trader margins contribute a significant proportion of total 
shipment value for all value chains. Since most agricultural inputs are imported, foreign 
costs are a high component of the total final costs. Moreover, taxation of fuels and other 
aspects of the transport sector greatly affect agricultural competitiveness.  
  Contrary to popular opinion, producer prices for cotton, maize and to some extent rice are 
higher than regional averages. In cotton and maize, this is as a result of the minimum 
prices set by the Government. While the minimum prices do benefit the producers, they 
inflate the total shipment values and thus reduce trade competitiveness.  
  Furthermore, high minimum producer prices undercut the margins for other chain players 
such as contractors, ginners and processors. This implies that some contractual services 
such as extension, transport and others may not be provided. This has long-term 
implications on agricultural performance. 
  In order to improve and sustain the competitive edge, there is need for more rapid 
technology transformation targeting productivity growth. Secondly, there is need for 
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